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Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem

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  • J. Arin

Abstract

Young’s theorem implies that every core concept violates monotonicity. In this paper, we investigate when such a violation of monotonicity by a given core concept is justified. We introduce a new monotonicity property for core concepts. We pose several open questions for this new property. The open questions arise because the most important core concepts (the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus) do not satisfy the property even in the class of convex games. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

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  • J. Arin, 2013. "Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 325-337, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:2:p:325-337
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0368-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maike Hoffmann & Peter Sudhölter, 2007. "The Shapley value of exact assignment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 557-568, April.
    2. J. Arin & V. Feltkamp, 2005. "Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 13(2), pages 331-341, December.
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    4. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 2012. "Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(1), pages 208-213.
    6. Arin, Javier & Kuipers, Jeroen & Vermeulen, Dries, 2003. "Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 327-345, December.
    7. David Housman & (*), Lori Clark, 1998. "Note Core and monotonic allocation methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 611-616.
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    Cited by:

    1. Calleja, Pere & Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2018. "Weak fairness and the Shapley value," Working Papers 2072/306979, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    2. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena, 2017. "Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 197-220, January.
    3. Manfred Besner, 2020. "Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 851-873, September.
    4. Julio González-Díaz & Miguel Mirás Calvo & Carmen Sandomingo & Estela Rodríguez, 2015. "Monotonicity of the core-center of the airport game," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 23(3), pages 773-798, October.
    5. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc, 2020. "Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 28-33.
    6. J. Arin & I. Katsev, 2016. "A monotonic core solution for convex TU games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 1013-1029, November.

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