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The effect of meeting rates on matching outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Sonia Jaffe

    (University of Chicago)

  • Simon Weber

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

We extend the classic matching model of Choo and Siow (J Polit Econ 114(1):175–201, 2006) to allow for the possibility that the rate at which potential partners meet affects their probability of matching. We investigate the implications for the levels and supermodularity of the estimated match surplus.

Suggested Citation

  • Sonia Jaffe & Simon Weber, 2019. "The effect of meeting rates on matching outcomes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(2), pages 363-378, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:67:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1113-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1113-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
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    10. Rania Gihleb & Kevin Lang, 2020. "Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not Increased," Research in Labor Economics, in: Change at Home, in the Labor Market, and On the Job, volume 48, pages 1-26, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    11. Gunter J. Hitsch & Ali Hortaçsu & Dan Ariely, 2010. "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 130-163, March.
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    13. Michèle Belot & Marco Francesconi, 2013. "Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate Choice Decisions," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(2), pages 474-508.
    14. Gustaf Bruze, 2011. "Marriage Choices of Movie Stars: Does Spouse's Education Matter?," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-28.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arnaud Dupuy, 2021. "Migration in China: To work or to wed?," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(4), pages 393-415, June.
    2. Lauren HOEHN-VELASCO & Jacob PENGLASE, 2023. "Changes in assortative matching and educational inequality: evidence from marriage and birth records in Mexico," JODE - Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 587-607, December.
    3. Alfred Galichon & Robert McCann, 2019. "Special Issue: Optimal Transportation, Equilibrium, and Applications to Economics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(2), pages 345-347, March.
    4. Jacques Silber & Sasiwimon Warunsiri Paweenawat & Lusi Liao, 2022. "On the measurement of non-random mating and of its change over time," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 161-198, March.

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