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The bargaining set of a large game

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  • Massimiliano Amarante & Luigi Montrucchio, 2010. "The bargaining set of a large game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(3), pages 313-349, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:43:y:2010:i:3:p:313-349
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0433-x
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    1. Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2003. "Cores and stable sets of finite dimensional games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 07-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    2. TamÂs Solymosi, 1999. "On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 229-240.
    3. Hart, Sergiu & Neyman, Abraham, 1988. "Values of non-atomic vector measure games : Are they linear combinations of the measures?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 31-40, February.
    4. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Zemel, 1982. "Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(3), pages 476-478, August.
    5. Dov Monderer & Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno, 1998. "The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 585-601.
    6. Daniel Granot & Frieda Granot, 1992. "On Some Network Flow Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 792-841, November.
    7. Yevgenia Apartsin & Ron Holzman, 2003. "The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(2), pages 189-204, December.
    8. Massimiliano Amarante & Fabio Maccheroni, 2006. "When an Event Makes a Difference," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 119-126, May.
    9. Luigi Montrucchio & Patrizia Semeraro, 2008. "Refinement Derivatives and Values of Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(1), pages 97-118, February.
    10. Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter, 2004. "Bargaining Sets of Voting Games," Discussion Paper Series dp376, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    11. M. Amarante & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci & L. Montrucchio, 2006. "Cores of non-atomic market games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 399-424, October.
    12. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
    13. Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2005. "Stable cores of large games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(2), pages 189-213, June.
    14. Ron Holzman, 2001. "The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 543-553.
    15. Tourky, Rabee & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2001. "Markets with Many More Agents than Commodities: Aumann's "Hidden" Assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 189-221, November.
    16. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
    17. MERTENS, Jean-François, 1980. "Values and derivatives," LIDAM Reprints CORE 435, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    18. Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1997. "Core Equivalence Theorems for Infinite Convex Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-12, September.
    19. Milchtaich, Igal, 1998. "Vector Measure Games Based on Measures with Values in an Infinite Dimensional Vector Space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 25-46, July.
    20. Itzhak Gilboa, 2004. "Uncertainty in Economic Theory," Post-Print hal-00756317, HAL.
    21. Jean-François Mertens, 1980. "Values and Derivatives," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 5(4), pages 523-552, November.
    22. Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, December.
    23. Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov, 1999. "On the Least Core and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 181-188, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Amarante, Massimiliano, 2014. "A characterization of exact non-atomic market games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 59-62.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mas-Colell bargaining set; Maximal excess game; Core-equivalence; Thin games; Market games; Lyapunov convexity theorem; C71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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