A note on the value of public information in monopoly
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0137-z
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Subir Bose & Gerhard Orosel & Marco Ottaviani & Lise Vesterlund, 2008. "Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 203-241, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
Monopoly; Product quality; Public information; Affiliation; Right-tail increasing; Linkage principle; D42; D82; D83; L15;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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