Executive compensation: a calibration approach
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Note: Received: August 12, 1997; revised version: October 27, 1997
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- Joseph G. Haubrich & Ivilina Popova, 1994. "Executive compensation: a calibration approach," Working Papers (Old Series) 9416, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Henry Penikas, 2012. "An Optimal Incentive Contract Preventing Excessive Risk-Taking by a Bank Manager," HSE Working papers WP BRP 03/FE/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug & Oliver Spalt, 2010.
"Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2015-2050, December.
- Dittmann, Ingolf & Maug, Ernst & Spalt, Oliver, 2007. "Sticks or carrots? Optimal CEO compensation when managers are loss averse," Papers 07-36, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug, 2007.
"Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 303-343, February.
- Maug, Ernst & Dittmann, Ingolf, 2007. "Lower Salaries and No Options: The Optimal Structure of Executive Pay," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-41, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Maug, Ernst & Dittmann, Ingolf, 2007. "Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay [Lower salaries and no options? On the optimal structure of executive pay]," Papers 07-41, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Jorge Aseff & Manuel Santos, 2005.
"Stock options and managerial optimal contracts,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 813-837, November.
- Manuel Santos & Jorge Aseff, "undated". "Stock Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts," Working Papers 2133304, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
- Josef Schroth, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(5), pages 1335-1381, December.
- Josef Schroth, 2015. "Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation," Staff Working Papers 15-25, Bank of Canada.
- Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 2003. "On the Efficacy of Contractual Provisions for Processing Tomatoes," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 21990, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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More about this item
Keywords
Calibration · Executive compensation · Principal-agent.;JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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