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Do we need a global fisheries management organization?

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  • J. Barkin
  • Elizabeth DeSombre

Abstract

Global fisheries are increasingly overfished. The existing international regulatory structure, a set of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), has failed to prevent overfishing. Regulatory problems exist because of the common pool resource character of fisheries and the fishing overcapacity that results from short-term planning and the political power of domestic fishing constituencies. But the regulatory problem comes from the region and species focus of RFMOs (micro-regulation), which creates what we refer to as a “balloon problem.” Even when RFMO regulations restrict access to a particular species or region, fishers move to another region to fish or target different species to maintain their fishing effort. We argue that in order to address these issues successfully and create more effective international fisheries governance, we need to begin a focus on macro-regulation, the creation of rules that address the amount of total fishing industry capacity in the overall system. Copyright AESS 2013

Suggested Citation

  • J. Barkin & Elizabeth DeSombre, 2013. "Do we need a global fisheries management organization?," Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, Springer;Association of Environmental Studies and Sciences, vol. 3(2), pages 232-242, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jenvss:v:3:y:2013:i:2:p:232-242
    DOI: 10.1007/s13412-013-0112-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Raakjær Nielsen, Jesper & Mathiesen, Christoph, 2003. "Important factors influencing rule compliance in fisheries lessons from Denmark," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 409-416, September.
    2. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Elizabeth R. DeSombre, 2005. "Fishing under Flags of Convenience: Using Market Power to Increase Participation in International Regulation," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 73-94, November.
    4. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-460, July.
    5. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Jacques, Peter J., 2015. "Are world fisheries a global panarchy?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 165-170.

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