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Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources

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  • Anastasios Xepapadeas

Abstract

The evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that in long‐run equilibrium, coexistence of both cooperative and non‐cooperative rules is possible under regulation. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.

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  • Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(3), pages 583-599, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:107:y:2005:i:3:p:583-599
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00424.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Tavoni & Maja Schlüter & Simon Levin, 2010. "The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management," Working Papers 2010.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Shahbaz, Muhammad & Hye, Qazi Muhammad Adnan & Tiwari, Aviral Kumar & Leitão, Nuno Carlos, 2013. "Economic growth, energy consumption, financial development, international trade and CO2 emissions in Indonesia," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 109-121.
    3. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(3), pages 583-599, September.
    4. Eftichios Sartzetakis & Anastasios Xepapadeas & Athanasios Yannacopoulos, 2015. "Regulating the Environmental Consequences of Preferences for Social Status within an Evolutionary Framework," DEOS Working Papers 1502, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    5. Anastasios Xepapadeas & Constadina Passa, 2004. "Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0403, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    6. Wehner, Nicholas & Mackay, Mary & Jennings, Sarah & van Putten, E.I. & Sibly, Hugh & Yamazaki, Satoshi, 2018. "When push comes to shove in recreational fishing compliance, think ‘nudge’," MarXiv 2fyuc, Center for Open Science.
    7. Petrohilos-Andrianos, Yannis & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2017. "Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 236-253.
    8. Sartzetakis, Eftichios & Xepapadeas, Anastasios & Yannacopoulos, Athanasios N., 2023. "Environmental regulation with preferences for social status," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    9. Muhammad, Shahbaz, 2012. "Multivariate granger causality between CO2 Emissions, energy intensity, financial development and economic growth: evidence from Portugal," MPRA Paper 37774, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Mar 2012.
    10. Muhammad, Shahbaz & Lean, Hooi Hooi & Muhammad, Shahbaz Shabbir, 2011. "Environmental Kuznets Curve and the role of energy consumption in Pakistan," MPRA Paper 34929, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Nov 2011.
    11. Shahbaz, Muhammad & Lean, Hooi Hooi & Shabbir, Muhammad Shahbaz, 2012. "Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis in Pakistan: Cointegration and Granger causality," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 2947-2953.
    12. Jeffrey Andrews & Matthew Clark & Vicken Hillis & Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, 2024. "The cultural evolution of collective property rights for sustainable resource governance," Nature Sustainability, Nature, vol. 7(4), pages 404-412, April.
    13. Muhammad, Shahbaz & Adebola Solarin, Solarin & Ozturk, Ilhan, 2016. "Environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis and the role of globalization in selected African countries," MPRA Paper 69859, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Mar 2016.
    14. Anastasios Xepapadeas & Constadina Passa, 2005. "Design of Public Voluntary Environmental Programs for Nitrate Pollution in Agriculture: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0512, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    15. Esther Blanco & Javier Lozano, 2015. "Ecolabels, uncertified abatement, and the sustainability of natural resources: an evolutionary approach," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 623-647, July.
    16. Constadina Passa & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2008. "Regulation of Farming Activities: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0811, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    17. Lamantia, F. & Radi, D., 2015. "Exploitation of renewable resources with differentiated technologies: An evolutionary analysis," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 155-174.
    18. Marta Biancardi & Gianluca Iannucci & Giovanni Villani, 2022. "An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 831-847, November.
    19. Angelo Antoci & Simone Borghesi & Gianluca Iannucci, 2021. "(Dis)honest bureaucrats and (non)compliant firms in an evolutionary game," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 321-344, May.
    20. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
    21. Muhammad, Shahbaz & Faridul, Islam & Muhammad Sabihuddin, Butt, 2011. "Financial Development, Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions: Evidence from ARDL Approach for Pakistan," MPRA Paper 30138, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Apr 2011.

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    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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