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Cost sharing on prices for games on graphs

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Li Li

    (Shanghai University)

  • Erfang Shan

    (Shanghai University)

Abstract

Let $$N=\{1,\dots ,n\}$$ N = { 1 , ⋯ , n } be a set of customers who want to buy a single homogenous goods in market. Let $$q_i>0$$ q i > 0 be the quantity that $$i\in N$$ i ∈ N demands, $$q=(q_1,\dots ,q_n)$$ q = ( q 1 , ⋯ , q n ) and $$q_S=\sum _{i\in S}q_i$$ q S = ∑ i ∈ S q i for $$S\subseteq N$$ S ⊆ N . If f(s) is a (increasing and concave) cost function, then it yields a cooperative game (N, f, q) by defining characteristic function $$v(S)=f(q_S)$$ v ( S ) = f ( q S ) for $$S\subseteq N$$ S ⊆ N . We now consider the way of taking packages of goods by customers and define a communication graph L on N, in which i and j are linked if they can take packages for each other. So if i and j are connected, then a package can be delivered from i to j by some intermediators. We thus admit any connected subset as a feasible coalition, and obtain a game (N, f, q, L) by defining characteristic function $$v_L(S)=\sum _{R\in S/L}f(q_R)$$ v L ( S ) = ∑ R ∈ S / L f ( q R ) for $$S\subseteq N$$ S ⊆ N , where S / L is the family of induced components (maximal connected subset) in S. It is shown that there is an allocation (cost shares) $$x=(x_1,\dots ,x_n)$$ x = ( x 1 , ⋯ , x n ) from the core for the game ( $$x_S\le v_L(S)$$ x S ≤ v L ( S ) for any $$S\subseteq N$$ S ⊆ N ) such that x satisfies Component Efficiency and Ranking for Unit Prices. If f(s) and q satisfy some further condition, then there is an allocation x from the core such that x satisfies Component Efficiency, and $$x_i \le x_j$$ x i ≤ x j and $$\frac{x_i}{q_i} \ge \frac{x_j}{q_j}$$ x i q i ≥ x j q j if $$q_i \le q_j$$ q i ≤ q j for i and j in the same component of N.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Li Li & Erfang Shan, 2017. "Cost sharing on prices for games on graphs," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 676-688, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:34:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10878-016-0099-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10878-016-0099-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative game; Graph game; Cost sharing; Ranking; Unit price;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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