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On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation games

Author

Listed:
  • Anna Angelucci

    (University of L’Aquila)

  • Vittorio Bilò

    (University of Salento)

  • Michele Flammini

    (University of L’Aquila
    Gran Sasso Science Institute)

  • Luca Moscardelli

    (University of Chieti-Pescara)

Abstract

We study the performance of subgame perfect equilibria, a solution concept which better captures the players’ rationality in sequential games with respect to the classical myopic dynamics based on the notions of improving deviations and Nash equilibria, in the context of sequential isolation games. In particular, for two important classes of sequential isolation games, we show upper and lower bounds on the sequential price of anarchy, that is the worst-case ratio between the social performance of an optimal solution and that of a subgame perfect equilibrium, under the two classical social functions mostly investigated in the scientific literature, namely, the minimum utility per player and the sum of the players’ utilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Angelucci & Vittorio Bilò & Michele Flammini & Luca Moscardelli, 2015. "On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation games," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 165-181, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:29:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1007_s10878-013-9694-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10878-013-9694-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
    2. Vittorio Bilò & Michele Flammini & Gianpiero Monaco & Luca Moscardelli, 2011. "On the performances of Nash equilibria in isolation games," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 378-391, October.
    3. Aritra Banik & Bhaswar B. Bhattacharya & Sandip Das, 2013. "Optimal strategies for the one-round discrete Voronoi game on a line," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 655-669, November.
    4. H. A. Eiselt & Gilbert Laporte & Jacques-François Thisse, 1993. "Competitive Location Models: A Framework and Bibliography," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(1), pages 44-54, February.
    5. Leah Epstein & Sven O. Krumke & Asaf Levin & Heike Sperber, 2011. "Selfish bin coloring," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 531-548, November.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Jasper Jong & Marc Uetz, 2020. "The quality of equilibria for set packing and throughput scheduling games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 321-344, March.

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