IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/infosf/v14y2012i3d10.1007_s10796-010-9290-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Analysis of pricing strategies for community-based group buying: The impact of competition and waiting cost

Author

Listed:
  • Yung-Ming Li

    (National Chiao Tung University)

  • Jhih-Hua Jhang-Li

    (National Chiao Tung University)

  • Ting-Kai Hwang

    (Ming Chuan University)

  • Ping-Wen Chen

    (Southern Taiwan University)

Abstract

Group buying is one of the major pricing mechanisms in which retailers can offer low group rates due to a saving on transaction costs and its target consumers are those with lower sensitivity on waiting time. Under group buying, group size significantly affects the waiting cost to which consumers have different tolerances. In this paper, we develop a two-stage pricing game to evaluate the impact of the waiting cost, competition, and group-facilitating technology on the profitability and efficiency of community-based group buying. Our results point out that when a monopolistic retailer operates a mixed channel, the retailer will charge a relatively high group rates in the group-buying channel to force most consumers to choose individual buying unless the transaction cost in the individual-buying channel is sufficiently high. If two competing retailers adopt different pure channels, investment in group-facilitating technology may weaken the profit of the retailer adopting community-based group buying when the actual selling-cost saving resulted from community-based group buying is not significant.

Suggested Citation

  • Yung-Ming Li & Jhih-Hua Jhang-Li & Ting-Kai Hwang & Ping-Wen Chen, 2012. "Analysis of pricing strategies for community-based group buying: The impact of competition and waiting cost," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 633-645, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:infosf:v:14:y:2012:i:3:d:10.1007_s10796-010-9290-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10796-010-9290-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10796-010-9290-9
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10796-010-9290-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    2. Schmalensee, Richard, 1984. "Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 211-230, January.
    3. Robert J. Dolan, 1987. "Quantity Discounts: Managerial Issues and Research Opportunities," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 1-22.
    4. James P. Monahan, 1984. "A Quantity Discount Pricing Model to Increase Vendor Profits," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(6), pages 720-726, June.
    5. John Seely Brown & Paul Duguid, 2001. "Knowledge and Organization: A Social-Practice Perspective," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 198-213, April.
    6. Greenhut,Melvin L. & Norman,George & Hung,Chao-Shun, 1987. "The Economics of Imperfect Competition," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315647.
    7. Carbajo, Jose & de Meza, David & Seidmann, Daniel J, 1990. "A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 283-298, March.
    8. Fan, Ming & Kumar, Subodha & Whinston, Andrew B., 2009. "Short-term and long-term competition between providers of shrink-wrap software and software as a service," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 196(2), pages 661-671, July.
    9. Bikram Ghosh & Subramanian Balachander, 2007. "Research Note--Competitive Bundling and Counterbundling with Generalist and Specialist Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(1), pages 159-168, January.
    10. Maqbool Dada & K. N. Srikanth, 1987. "Pricing Policies for Quantity Discounts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(10), pages 1247-1252, October.
    11. Wendy W. Moe & Peter S. Fader, 2004. "Dynamic Conversion Behavior at E-Commerce Sites," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(3), pages 326-335, March.
    12. Chen, Yongmin, 1997. "Equilibrium Product Bundling," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(1), pages 85-103, January.
    13. Rajeev Kohli & Heungsoo Park, 1989. "A Cooperative Game Theory Model of Quantity Discounts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(6), pages 693-707, June.
    14. Krishnan S. Anand & Ravi Aron, 2003. "Group Buying on the Web: A Comparison of Price-Discovery Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(11), pages 1546-1562, November.
    15. Z. Kevin Weng, 1995. "Channel Coordination and Quantity Discounts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(9), pages 1509-1522, September.
    16. R. Venkatesh & Wagner Kamakura, 2003. "Optimal Bundling and Pricing under a Monopoly: Contrasting Complements and Substitutes from Independently Valued Products," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(2), pages 211-232, April.
    17. Matutes, Carmen & Regibeau, Pierre, 1992. "Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary Goods in a Duopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 37-54, March.
    18. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 424-440, June.
    19. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 371-383.
    20. Charles J. Corbett & Xavier de Groote, 2000. "A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(3), pages 444-450, March.
    21. Xianjun Geng & Maxwell B. Stinchcombe & Andrew B. Whinston, 2005. "Bundling Information Goods of Decreasing Value," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(4), pages 662-667, April.
    22. William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(3), pages 475-498.
    23. Greenhut,Melvin L. & Norman,George & Hung,Chao-Shun, 1987. "The Economics of Imperfect Competition," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521305525.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Huang, Yeu-Shiang & Ho, Jyh-Wen & Lee, Chang-Lin, 2024. "Group buying in multiple channels with consideration of heterogeneous customers," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 270(C).
    2. Mohammad Alamgir Hossain & Shams Rahman, 2021. "Investigating the Success of OGB in China: The Influence of Personality Traits," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 543-559, June.
    3. Chulhwan Chris Bang, 2015. "Information systems frontiers: Keyword analysis and classification," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 217-237, February.
    4. Chenxu Ke & Bo Yan & Ruofan Xu, 2017. "A group-buying mechanism for considering strategic consumer behavior," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 721-752, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ashutosh Prasad & R. Venkatesh & Vijay Mahajan, 2010. "Optimal Bundling of Technological Products with Network Externality," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(12), pages 2224-2236, December.
    2. Sang‐Hyun Kim & Jong‐Hee Hahn, 2022. "On the profitability of interfirm bundling in oligopolies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 657-673, August.
    3. Ashutosh Prasad & R. Venkatesh & Vijay Mahajan, 2017. "Temporal product bundling with myopic and strategic consumers: Manifestations and relative effectiveness," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 341-368, December.
    4. Girju, Marina & Prasad, Ashutosh & Ratchford, Brian T., 2013. "Pure Components versus Pure Bundling in a Marketing Channel," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 89(4), pages 423-437.
    5. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 34, pages 2221-2299, Elsevier.
    6. Cao, Qingning & Geng, Xianjun & Zhang, Jun, 2015. "Strategic Role of Retailer Bundling in a Distribution Channel," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 50-67.
    7. Bikram Ghosh & Subramanian Balachander, 2007. "Research Note--Competitive Bundling and Counterbundling with Generalist and Specialist Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(1), pages 159-168, January.
    8. Jeffrey D. Shulman & Xianjun Geng, 2013. "Add-on Pricing by Asymmetric Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 899-917, April.
    9. Akifumi Ishihara & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2013. "Dark Sides of Patent Pools with Compulsory Independent Licensing," CARF F-Series CARF-F-318, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    10. Mayer, Stefan & Klein, Robert & Seiermann, Stephanie, 2013. "A simulation-based approach to price optimisation of the mixed bundling problem with capacity constraints," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 584-598.
    11. Sheikhzadeh, Mehdi & Elahi, Ehsan, 2013. "Product bundling: Impacts of product heterogeneity and risk considerations," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 209-222.
    12. Jidong Zhou, 2017. "Competitive Bundling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 145-172, January.
    13. Gayer, Amit & Shy, Oz, 2016. "A welfare evaluation of tying strategies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 623-637.
    14. Andrea Mantovani, 2013. "The Strategic Effect of Bundling: A New Perspective," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(1), pages 25-43, February.
    15. Vithala R. Rao & Gary J. Russell & Hemant Bhargava & Alan Cooke & Tim Derdenger & Hwang Kim & Nanda Kumar & Irwin Levin & Yu Ma & Nitin Mehta & John Pracejus & R. Venkatesh, 2018. "Emerging Trends in Product Bundling: Investigating Consumer Choice and Firm Behavior," Customer Needs and Solutions, Springer;Institute for Sustainable Innovation and Growth (iSIG), vol. 5(1), pages 107-120, March.
    16. Kopczewski, Tomasz & Sobolewski, Maciej & Miernik, Ireneusz, 2018. "Bundling or unbundling? Integrated simulation model of optimal pricing strategies," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 328-345.
    17. Reisinger, Markus, 2004. "The Effects of Product Bundling in Duopoly," Discussion Papers in Economics 477, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    18. Subramanian Balachander & Bikram Ghosh & Axel Stock, 2010. "Why Bundle Discounts Can Be a Profitable Alternative to Competing on Price Promotions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 624-638, 07-08.
    19. Qianbo Yin & Kwei‐Long Huang & Chia‐Wei Kuo & Sean X. Zhou, 2021. "Add‐On Pricing in a Distribution Channel," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(11), pages 4069-4088, November.
    20. Prasad, Ashutosh & Venkatesh, R. & Mahajan, Vijay, 2015. "Product bundling or reserved product pricing? Price discrimination with myopic and strategic consumers," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-8.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:infosf:v:14:y:2012:i:3:d:10.1007_s10796-010-9290-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.