IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/grdene/v29y2020i1d10.1007_s10726-019-09649-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Two-Step Proportional Rule for Division with Multiple References

Author

Listed:
  • A. M. Mármol

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

  • M. A. Hinojosa

    (Universidad Pablo de Olavide)

Abstract

Proportionality is a primary principle generally accepted when dividing a commodity between a set of agents characterized by their reference with respect to a certain characteristic. However, when multiple characteristics have to be taken into account, it is not clear how to define proportionality. We propose a two-step proportional rule for the class of division problems with multiple characteristics. The rule is based on the best expectations of the agents and incorporates the extensions of two crucial properties which are inherent to proportionality: the proportions obtained with respect to the different references cannot be improved simultaneously, and the result does not depend on the scale in which each of the characteristics is measured. We also prove that the two-step proportional rule can be understood as the result of a negotiation in which the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution is applied to a bargaining game between parties each one aiming to maximize the proportions that the set of agents attain with respect to the references of the corresponding characteristic.

Suggested Citation

  • A. M. Mármol & M. A. Hinojosa, 2020. "A Two-Step Proportional Rule for Division with Multiple References," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 127-141, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:29:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-019-09649-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-019-09649-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-019-09649-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10726-019-09649-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2009. "The proportional rule for multi-issue bankruptcy problems," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 474-481.
    2. M. Hinojosa & A. Mármol & F. Sánchez, 2013. "Extended proportionality in division problems with multiple references," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 206(1), pages 183-195, July.
    3. Sinan Ertemel & Rajnish Kumar, 2018. "Proportional rules for state contingent claims," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 229-246, March.
    4. Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
    5. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gustavo Berganti~nos & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2024. "Streaming problems as (multi-issue) claims problems," Papers 2412.18628, arXiv.org.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomson, William, 2015. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-59.
    2. Ephraim Zehavi & Amir Leshem, 2018. "On the Allocation of Multiple Divisible Assets to Players with Different Utilities," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 253-274, June.
    3. Omer F. Baris, 2018. "Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 547-556, June.
    4. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2022. "Monotonicity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(1), pages 338-346.
    5. Lea Melnikovová, 2017. "Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 65(4), pages 1393-1401.
    6. Daniele Cassese & Paolo Pin, 2018. "Decentralized Pure Exchange Processes on Networks," Papers 1803.08836, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
    7. Jens Leth Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2010. "Baseline Rationing," Discussion Papers 10-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    8. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & António Osório & Josep E. Peris, 2015. "From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(1), pages 1-7, March.
    9. Takeuchi, Ai & Veszteg, Róbert F. & Kamijo, Yoshio & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2022. "Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 169-198.
    10. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc, 2021. "Positive feedback in coordination games: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 355-373.
    11. Karna Basu & Kaushik Basu & Tito Cordella, 2016. "Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(6), pages 831-856, December.
    12. Yakov Babichenko & Leonard J. Schulman, 2015. "Pareto Efficient Nash Implementation Via Approval Voting," Papers 1502.05238, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2017.
    13. Teresa Estañ & Natividad Llorca & Ricardo Martínez & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2020. "On the difficulty of budget allocation in claims problems with indivisible items of different prices," ThE Papers 20/09, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    14. Teresa Estañ & Natividad Llorca & Ricardo Martínez & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2021. "On the Difficulty of Budget Allocation in Claims Problems with Indivisible Items and Prices," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(5), pages 1133-1159, October.
    15. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 107-109.
    16. Arzu Kıbrıs & Özgür Kıbrıs & Mehmet Yiğit Gürdal, 2022. "Protectionist demands in globalization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 345-365, September.
    17. Craig Webb, 2010. "Agreeing to spin the subjective roulette wheel: Bargaining with subjective mixtures," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1005, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    18. Saglam, Ismail, 2022. "Two-player bargaining problems with unilateral pre-donation," MPRA Paper 115203, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Ismail Saglam, 2017. "Iterated Kalai–Smorodinsky–Nash compromise," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 40(1), pages 335-349, November.
    20. Koshevoy, G.A. & Suzuki, T. & Talman, A.J.J., 2014. "Supermodular NTU-games," Discussion Paper 2014-067, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:29:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-019-09649-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.