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Nonlinear Negotiation Approaches for Complex-Network Optimization: A Study Inspired by Wi-Fi Channel Assignment

Author

Listed:
  • Ivan Marsa-Maestre

    (University of Alcalá)

  • Enrique Hoz

    (University of Alcalá)

  • Jose Manuel Gimenez-Guzman

    (University of Alcalá)

  • David Orden

    (University of Alcalá)

  • Mark Klein

    (Center for Collective Intelligence, MIT)

Abstract

At the present time, Wi-Fi networks are everywhere. They operate in unlicensed radio-frequency spectrum bands (divided in channels), which are highly congested. The purpose of this paper is to tackle the problem of channel assignment in Wi-Fi networks. To this end, we have modeled the networks as multilayer graphs, in a way that frequency channel assignment becomes a graph coloring problem. For a high number and variety of scenarios, we have solved the problem with two different automated negotiation techniques: a hill-climbing mediated negotiation and a simulated annealing mediated negotiation. As an upper bound reference for the performance of these two techniques, we have also solved the problem using a particle swarm optimizer. Results show that the annealer negotiator behaves as the best choice because it is able to obtain even better results than the particle swarm optimizer in the most complex scenarios under study, with running times one order of magnitude below. Moreover, we study how different properties of the network layout affect to the performance gain that the annealer is able to obtain with respect to the particle swarm optimizer. Finally, we show how the different strategic behavior of the participants affects the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan Marsa-Maestre & Enrique Hoz & Jose Manuel Gimenez-Guzman & David Orden & Mark Klein, 2019. "Nonlinear Negotiation Approaches for Complex-Network Optimization: A Study Inspired by Wi-Fi Channel Assignment," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 175-196, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:28:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-018-9600-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-018-9600-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Fabian Lang & Andreas Fink, 2015. "Learning from the Metaheuristics: Protocols for Automated Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 299-332, March.
    3. Mark Klein & Peyman Faratin & Hiroki Sayama & Yaneer Bar-Yam, 2003. "Negotiating Complex Contracts," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 111-125, March.
    4. Karen Aardal & Stan Hoesel & Arie Koster & Carlo Mannino & Antonio Sassano, 2007. "Models and solution techniques for frequency assignment problems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 79-129, September.
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