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Negotiation Engineering: A Quantitative Problem-Solving Approach to Negotiation

Author

Listed:
  • Tobias W. Langenegger

    (ETH Zurich)

  • Michael Ambühl

    (ETH Zurich)

Abstract

Although they are often complex, negotiations are practical problems that can be solved with the aid of specialized, ad hoc methods. We introduce a problem-solving approach to difficult negotiations inspired by the established solution-oriented discipline of engineering, which we term “Negotiation Engineering”. It is based on the reduction of problems to their most formal structures and the heuristic application of quantitative methods for problem solving. We argue that mathematical language in negotiations helps to increase logical accuracy in negotiation analysis and allows for the use of a variety of existing helpful mathematical tools to achieve a negotiation agreement. We demonstrate the practicability and usefulness of this approach using four case studies in the area of international diplomacy in which Negotiation Engineering was applied to achieve negotiation solutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Tobias W. Langenegger & Michael Ambühl, 2018. "Negotiation Engineering: A Quantitative Problem-Solving Approach to Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 9-31, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:27:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-017-9547-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-017-9547-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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