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Justifications and Questions in Detecting Deception

Author

Listed:
  • Jihyun Esther Paik

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

  • Lyn M. Swol

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Abstract

Truth-tellers and deceivers use justifications to bolster their credibility, but given their different motivations, truth-tellers and deceivers may use justifications differently. Participants were assigned the role of allocator or recipient in an ultimatum game. Allocators received money based on their performance on a task and made an offer. Recipients did not have information about allocator’s task performance or amount the allocator received, and therefore, allocators could deceive. Liars provided more plausible details to support their offer by stating the structure of their task; this strategy backfired and led to more detection of lies. Truth-tellers were more likely to disclose advantageous information about their endowment of money in their justifications, and this reduced suspicion in their offers. Deceivers used more wrap-up questions to end the interaction; this did not help reduce partner suspicion. Asking questions in general did not improve detection accuracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Jihyun Esther Paik & Lyn M. Swol, 2017. "Justifications and Questions in Detecting Deception," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(6), pages 1041-1060, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:26:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-017-9536-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-017-9536-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Boles, Terry L. & Croson, Rachel T. A. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2000. "Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 235-259, November.
    2. Michael T. Braun & Lyn M. Swol, 2016. "Justifications Offered, Questions Asked, and Linguistic Patterns in Deceptive and Truthful Monetary Interactions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 641-661, May.
    3. Lina Zhou & Judee K. Burgoon & Jay F. Nunamaker & Doug Twitchell, 2004. "Automating Linguistics-Based Cues for Detecting Deception in Text-Based Asynchronous Computer-Mediated Communications," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 81-106, January.
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    5. repec:cup:judgdm:v:8:y:2013:i:5:p:632-638 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Lyn M. Swol & Michael T. Braun, 2014. "Communicating Deception: Differences in Language Use, Justifications, and Questions for Lies, Omissions, and Truths," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(6), pages 1343-1367, November.
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