IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/finsto/v27y2023i4d10.1007_s00780-023-00519-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Present-biased lobbyists in linear–quadratic stochastic differential games

Author

Listed:
  • Ali Lazrak

    (University of British Columbia)

  • Hanxiao Wang

    (Shenzhen University)

  • Jiongmin Yong

    (University of Central Florida)

Abstract

We investigate a linear–quadratic stochastic zero-sum game where two players lobby a political representative to invest in a wind farm. Players are time-inconsistent because they discount the utility with a non-constant rate. Our objective is to identify a consistent planning equilibrium in which the players are aware of their inconsistency and cannot commit to a lobbying policy. We analyse equilibrium behaviour in both single-player and two-player cases and compare the behaviours of the game under constant and variable discount rates. The equilibrium behaviour is provided in closed-loop form, either analytically or via numerical approximation. Our numerical analysis of the equilibrium reveals that strategic behaviour leads to more intense lobbying without resulting in overshooting.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali Lazrak & Hanxiao Wang & Jiongmin Yong, 2023. "Present-biased lobbyists in linear–quadratic stochastic differential games," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 947-984, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:finsto:v:27:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s00780-023-00519-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00519-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00780-023-00519-9
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00780-023-00519-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tomas Björk & Agatha Murgoci, 2014. "A theory of Markovian time-inconsistent stochastic control in discrete time," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 545-592, July.
    2. Calvo, Guillermo A & Obstfeld, Maurice, 1988. "Optimal Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy with Finite Lifetimes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 411-432, March.
    3. B. Douglas Bernheim, 1989. "Intergenerational Altruism, Dynastic Equilibria and Social Welfare," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(1), pages 119-128.
    4. Christopher Harris & David Laibson, 2013. "Instantaneous Gratification," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(1), pages 205-248.
    5. Matthew O. Jackson & Leeat Yariv, 2015. "Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 150-178, November.
    6. Camilo Hern'andez & Dylan Possamai, 2023. "Time-inconsistent contract theory," Papers 2303.01601, arXiv.org.
    7. Cetemen, Doruk & Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Urgun, Can, 2023. "Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    8. Blanchard, Olivier J, 1985. "Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(2), pages 223-247, April.
    9. Tomas Björk & Mariana Khapko & Agatha Murgoci, 2017. "On time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous time," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 331-360, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mariana Khapko, 2023. "Asset pricing with dynamically inconsistent agents," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 1017-1046, October.
    2. Ali Lazrak & Hanxiao Wang & Jiongmin Yong, 2023. "Present-Biased Lobbyists in Linear Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games," Papers 2304.11577, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    3. Cetemen, Doruk & Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Urgun, Can, 2023. "Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    4. Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2019. "Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting: Moral Hazard and Dynamic Inconsistency," Working Papers 2019-17, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    5. Xue Dong He & Xun Yu Zhou, 2021. "Who Are I: Time Inconsistency and Intrapersonal Conflict and Reconciliation," Papers 2105.01829, arXiv.org.
    6. Yu-Jui Huang & Adrien Nguyen-Huu, 2018. "Time-consistent stopping under decreasing impatience," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 69-95, January.
    7. Brito Paulo & Marini Giancarlo & Piergallini Alessandro, 2016. "House prices and monetary policy," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(3), pages 251-277, June.
    8. Tatiana Kirsanova & Simon Wren‐Lewis, 2012. "Optimal Fiscal Feedback on Debt in an Economy with Nominal Rigidities," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(559), pages 238-264, March.
    9. Fahrenwaldt, Matthias Albrecht & Jensen, Ninna Reitzel & Steffensen, Mogens, 2020. "Nonrecursive separation of risk and time preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 95-108.
    10. Nakata, Taisuke & Ogaki, Ryota & Schmidt, Sebastian & Yoo, Paul, 2019. "Attenuating the forward guidance puzzle: Implications for optimal monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 90-106.
    11. Erling Steigum & Øystein Thøgersen, 2003. "Borrow and Adjust: Fiscal Policy and Sectoral Adjustment in an Open Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 699-724, May.
    12. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1989. "Fiscal deficits and relative prices in a growing world economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 461-484, May.
    13. Marcel Nutz & Yuchong Zhang, 2019. "Conditional Optimal Stopping: A Time-Inconsistent Optimization," Papers 1901.05802, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2019.
    14. Meijdam, Lex & Verbon, Harrie A A, 1997. "Aging and Public Pensions in an Overlapping-Generations Model," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 29-42, January.
    15. Liyuan Lin & Fangda Liu & Jingzhen Liu abd Luyang Yu, 2023. "The optimal reinsurance strategy with price-competition between two reinsurers," Papers 2305.00509, arXiv.org.
    16. Tatiana Kirsanova & Mathan Satchi & David Vines & Simon Wren‐Lewis, 2007. "Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(7), pages 1759-1784, October.
    17. Kumhof, Michael & Laxton, Douglas & Leigh, Daniel, 2014. "To starve or not to starve the beast?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 1-23.
    18. Wendner, Ronald, 2008. "Externalities in a Model of Perpetual Youth with Age-Dependent Productivity," MPRA Paper 11335, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Endress, Lee H. & Pongkijvorasin, Sittidaj & Roumasset, James & Wada, Christopher A., 2014. "Intergenerational equity with individual impatience in a model of optimal and sustainable growth," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 620-635.
    20. Alain Bensoussan & Guiyuan Ma & Chi Chung Siu & Sheung Chi Phillip Yam, 2022. "Dynamic mean–variance problem with frictions," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 267-300, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Time inconsistency; Lobbying; Two-player zero-sum dynamic game; Linear–quadratic stochastic differential game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:finsto:v:27:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s00780-023-00519-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.