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On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games

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  • Vincenzo Scalzo

    (University of Naples Federico II)

Abstract

Our aim is to investigate the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the general setting of ordinal games. Using a new property, called strict condition, we identify a class of discontinuous games where there exists a unique Nash equilibrium if and only if the single deviation property is satisfied.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincenzo Scalzo, 2020. "On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 163-168, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-019-00175-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00175-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ceparano, Maria Carmela & Quartieri, Federico, 2017. "Nash equilibrium uniqueness in nice games with isotone best replies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 154-165.
    2. Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2016. "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 515-540, March.
    3. Chenault, Larry A., 1986. "On the uniqueness of Nash equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 203-205.
    4. Christensen, Finn, 2017. "A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique maximum with an application to potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 120-123.
    5. Belhaj, Mohamed & Bramoullé, Yann & Deroïan, Frédéric, 2014. "Network games under strategic complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 310-319.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium; Ordinal games; Discontinuous games; Strict condition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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