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Per-unit versus ad-valorem royalty licensing in a Stackelberg market

Author

Listed:
  • Manel Antelo

    (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

  • Lluís Bru

    (Universitat de les Illes Balears)

Abstract

We consider licensing of a non-drastic innovation by a licensor that interacts with a potential licensee in a Stackelberg duopoly, comparing per-unit and ad-valorem royalty two-part contracts and showing why and when each licensing deal should be used. We contribute three findings to the literature. First, ad-valorem royalty is preferred when the licensor plays as leader in the marketplace, but per-unit royalty is preferred when the licensor plays as follower. Second, only innovations that do not hurt consumers are socially beneficial. Third, our model also suggests that both the licensor’s status as a leader or follower in the marketplace and the innovation size determine the incentive to engage in innovative activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Manel Antelo & Lluís Bru, 2022. "Per-unit versus ad-valorem royalty licensing in a Stackelberg market," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(1), pages 95-109, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:epolin:v:49:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s40812-021-00205-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s40812-021-00205-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2022. "Licensing in a Stackelberg industry, product differentiation, and welfare," MPRA Paper 114181, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Nuno Costa & João Lourenço, 2022. "Bi-Objective Optimization Problems—A Game Theory Perspective to Improve Process and Product," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(22), pages 1-14, November.
    3. Masashi Umezawa, 2022. "Optimal two-part tariff licensing in a Stackelberg duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 42(2), pages 629-642.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Licensing; Per-unit royalties; Ad-valorem royalties; Leader; Follower; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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