IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/envpol/v9y2008i1p57-66.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A note on Coasean dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Alfred Entires
  • Bianca Rundshagen

Abstract

Under certain conditions, externalities may be internalized by voluntary agreements between the involved parties. According to the Coase theorem, the equilibrium allocation is independent from whether the property rights are assigned to the polluter or to the pollutee. In this article we extend the Coasean approach to a dynamic setting allowing for induced technical change. It is shown that, within the Coasean framework, not only equilibrium pollution abatement but also equilibrium investment into technical progress is Pareto optimal and independent from the distribution of property rights. Copyright Springer Japan 2008

Suggested Citation

  • Alfred Entires & Bianca Rundshagen, 2008. "A note on Coasean dynamics," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 9(1), pages 57-66, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:9:y:2008:i:1:p:57-66
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03353975
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF03353975
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF03353975?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Rohan Pitchford, 2003. "Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 491-516, October.
    3. Endres, Alfred, 1977. "Nonseparability and the voluntary approach to externality problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 209-213, September.
    4. Adam Gifford Jr. & Courtenay C. Stone, 1973. "Externalities, Liability And The Coase Theorem:A Mathematical Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 11(3), pages 260-269, September.
    5. Gifford, Adam, Jr & Stone, Courtenay C, 1975. "Externalities, Liability, Separability, and Resource Allocation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(4), pages 724-727, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alfred Endres & Tim Friehe & Bianca Rundshagen, 2015. "“It’s All in the Mix!”- Internalizing externalities with R&D subsidies and environmental liability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 151-178, January.
    2. Alfred Endres & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Generalized Progress of Abatement Technology: Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(1), pages 61-71, September.
    3. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alfred Entires & Bianca Rundshagen, 2008. "A note on Coasean dynamics," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 9(1), pages 57-66, March.
    2. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    3. Robert Innes & George Frisvold, 2009. "The Economics of Endangered Species," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 485-512, September.
    4. Bouwe R. Dijkstra, 2022. "Payments from Households to Distant Polluting Firms," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(3), pages 681-715, July.
    5. Pitchford, Rohan & Snyder, Christopher M., 2007. "The identity of the generator in the problem of social cost," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 49-67, July.
    6. Theodore Groves, 1974. "Information, Incentives and the Internalization of Production Externalities," Discussion Papers 87, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Annette Hofmann, 2007. "Internalizing externalities of loss prevention through insurance monopoly: an analysis of interdependent risks," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 32(1), pages 91-111, June.
    8. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    9. Qiuyue Xia & Lu Li & Jie Dong & Bin Zhang, 2021. "Reduction Effect and Mechanism Analysis of Carbon Trading Policy on Carbon Emissions from Land Use," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(17), pages 1-22, August.
    10. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.
    11. Usher, Dan, 2001. "Personal goods, efficiency and the law," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 673-703, November.
    12. George Tridimas & Stanley L. Winer, 2018. "On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion," Carleton Economic Papers 18-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    13. Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2005. "Assessing the Efficiency of an Insurance Provider—A Measurement Error Approach," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(1), pages 15-34, June.
    14. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
    15. Stefan Ambec & Yann Kervinio, 2016. "Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 119-155, January.
    16. Liu, Duan & Yu, Nizhou & Wan, Hong, 2022. "Does water rights trading affect corporate investment? The role of resource allocation and risk mitigation channels," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    17. Valcu-Lisman, Adriana & Weninger, Quinn, 2012. "Markov-Perfect rent dissipation in rights-based fisheries," ISU General Staff Papers 201209260700001037, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    18. Hausknost, Daniel & Grima, Nelson & Singh, Simron Jit, 2017. "The political dimensions of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES): Cascade or stairway?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 109-118.
    19. Kurtis Swope & Ryan Wielgus & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan, 2011. "Contracts, Behavior, and the Land-assembly Problem: An Experimental Study," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability, pages 151-180, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    20. Ralph E. Townsend, 2010. "Transactions costs as an obstacle to fisheries self-governance in New Zealand," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), pages 301-320, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coase theorem; Technical progress;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:9:y:2008:i:1:p:57-66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.