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The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges

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  • Steven Craig
  • Yi-Cheng Ho
  • Alan Satterlee

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Suggested Citation

  • Steven Craig & Yi-Cheng Ho & Alan Satterlee, 2008. "The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-285, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:9:y:2008:i:3:p:265-285
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-007-0042-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Craig, Steven G. & Holsey, Cheryl M., 1997. "Efficient inequality: differential allocation in the local public sector," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 763-784, November.
    2. Larry Schroeder & David Sjoquist, 1978. "The rational voter: an analysis of two Atlanta referenda on rapid transit," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 27-44, January.
    3. Edward J. Mathis & Charles E. Zech, 1985. "The Community Demand for Police Officers," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 401-410, October.
    4. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1979. "Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 563-587.
    5. Craig Steven G. & Hsieh Edward Wei-Te, 1994. "Local Public Good Provision under Uncertainty: Do Monopoly Bureaus Wield Carrots -- or Sticks?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 184-208, September.
    6. Denzau, Arthur T & Mackay, Robert J, 1976. "Benefit Shares and Majority Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 69-76, March.
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