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An experimental study on voluntary vs. compulsory provision of public goods under the vote-with-feet mechanism

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  • Hui-Chun Peng

    (National Taipei University)

Abstract

This paper conducts laboratory experiments to investigate how the individuals with heterogeneous income levels endogenously select the institution in public good provision in a Tiebout-like environment. According to the experimental results, I find that heterogeneous individuals have different choices of contribution institutions. High-income individuals tend to participate in the voluntary contribution institution, but low-income individuals tend to choose the compulsory one. I also find that most high-income individuals in the voluntary contribution institution try to free ride on others. Therefore, although the vote-with-feet mechanism helps to sort heterogeneous individuals in different contribution institutions, it may not enhance the cooperation among the individuals in the voluntary contribution community.

Suggested Citation

  • Hui-Chun Peng, 2021. "An experimental study on voluntary vs. compulsory provision of public goods under the vote-with-feet mechanism," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 1-19, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eaiere:v:18:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s40844-020-00192-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s40844-020-00192-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Compulsory contribution; Voluntary contribution; Vote-with-feet mechanism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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