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Interpreting the iterated dilemma games using the presentation like “cellular automatons”

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  • Yuji Aruka

    (Chuo University)

Abstract

Myopic optimization around scarce resources makes the least use of available information. Such optimization was a winning strategy in the stage when big data were not common but is no longer effective. In reality, winning game differs from the maximizing payoffs. In this article, we focus on an ontological meaning of the game and the time development of the dilemma game. In particular, we are interested in the time development of the dilemma game. After examining the structure of the iterated game, we then introduce the Wolfram simulator by Seth Chandler (2011) to the original form. This is the presentation like “cellular automatons” (CA-like presentation) of the iterated game. We furthermore expand his original program to discuss TFT, ESS, Avatamsaka game, and the tagging mechanism. The use of CA-like presentation may renovate the traditional implications of the game solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuji Aruka, 2018. "Interpreting the iterated dilemma games using the presentation like “cellular automatons”," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 351-365, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eaiere:v:15:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s40844-018-0113-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s40844-018-0113-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Akira Namatame & Taisei Kaizouji & Yuuji Aruka (ed.), 2006. "The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer, number 978-3-540-28727-8, December.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
    3. Damien J. A. Bazin, 2011. "Marketstructure and equilibrium," Post-Print halshs-00727586, HAL.
    4. Heinrich von Stackelberg, 2011. "Market Structure and Equilibrium," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-642-12586-7, July.
    5. Yuji Aruka & Eizo Akiyama, 2009. "Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 4(2), pages 135-161, November.
    6. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
    7. Eizo Akiyama & Yuji Aruka, 2006. "Evolution of Reciprocal Cooperation in the Avatamsaka Game," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Akira Namatame & Taisei Kaizouji & Yuuji Aruka (ed.), The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions, pages 307-320, Springer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuji Aruka, 2020. "The evolution of the exchange process: from the decentralized to the distributed digital exchange," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 379-398, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    2-by-2 game; Iterated game; Time development; CA-like presentation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C18 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Methodolical Issues: General

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