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Evolution of Reciprocal Cooperation in the Avatamsaka Game

In: The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions

Author

Listed:
  • Eizo Akiyama

    (University of Tsukuba)

  • Yuji Aruka

    (Chuo University)

Abstract

Summary The Avatamsaka game is investigated both analytically and using computer simulations. The Avatamsaka game is a dependent game in which each agent’s payoff depends completely not on her own decision but on the other players’. Consequently, any combination of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium. Analysis and evolutionary simulations show that the socially optimal state becomes evolutionarily stable by a Pavlovian strategy in the repeated Avatamsaka game, and also in any kind of dependent game. The mechanism of the evolutionary process is investigated from the viewpoint of the agent’s memory and mutation of strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Eizo Akiyama & Yuji Aruka, 2006. "Evolution of Reciprocal Cooperation in the Avatamsaka Game," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Akira Namatame & Taisei Kaizouji & Yuuji Aruka (ed.), The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions, pages 307-320, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-28727-8_21
    DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28727-2_21
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuji Aruka & Eizo Akiyama, 2009. "Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 4(2), pages 135-161, November.
    2. Yuji Aruka, 2024. "Interpreting the Iterated Dilemma Games by Using the Presentation Like “Cellular Automatons”," Springer Texts in Business and Economics, in: Evolutionary Economics, chapter 0, pages 57-72, Springer.

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