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Masahiko Aoki’s conception of institutions

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  • Hirokazu Takizawa

    (Chuo University)

Abstract

The present study examines Masahiko Aoki’s continual attempts to conceptualize institutions, with main focus on Aoki (Toward a comparative institutional analysis. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001; J Econ Behav Organ, 79:20–34, 2011). The unique aspect of his approach is identified as his efforts to grasp the dynamic and collective-cognitive nature of institutions. Highly valuing this uniqueness, I identified several difficulties in this approach. In this study, I argue that the profound nature of institutions is beyond the formal description of game theory, which Aoki maintained in his lifetime. I also argue that the Hegelian perspective submitted by Herrmann-Pillath and Boldyrev (Hegel, institutions and economics: performing the social. Routledge, London, 2014) suggests a possible future direction of the research on institutions in economics, albeit not necessarily one amenable to mathematical formulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hirokazu Takizawa, 2017. "Masahiko Aoki’s conception of institutions," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 523-540, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eaiere:v:14:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s40844-017-0087-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s40844-017-0087-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 16, pages 267-297, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Hindriks, Frank & Guala, Francesco, 2015. "Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 459-480, September.
    4. Searle, John R., 2015. "Status functions and institutional facts: reply to Hindriks and Guala," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 507-514, September.
    5. Aoki, Masahiko, 2010. "Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance, and Institutions," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199218530.
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    7. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Institutions as cognitive media between strategic interactions and individual beliefs," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 17, pages 298-312, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    10. Hodgson, Geoffrey M., 2015. "On defining institutions: rules versus equilibria," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 497-505, September.
    11. Aoki, Masahiko, 2015. "Why is the equilibrium notion essential for a unified institutional theory? A friendly remark on the article by Hindriks and Guala," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 485-488, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutions; Conception of institutions; Aoki;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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