A Strongly Group Strategyproof and Shill Resistant Bargaining Mechanism for Fog Resource Pricing
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00550-7
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Keywords
Finitely repeated game; Bargaining mechanism; Group strategyproofness; Shills;All these keywords.
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