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Simulating complex social behaviour with the genetic action tree kernel

Author

Listed:
  • Thorsten Chmura

    (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

  • Johannes Kaiser

    (University of Bonn)

  • Thomas Pitz

    (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

Abstract

The concept of genetic action trees combines action trees with genetic algorithms. In this paper, we create a multi-agent simulation on the base of this concept and provide the interested reader with a software package to apply genetic action trees in a multi-agent simulation to simulate complex social behaviour. An example model is introduced to conduct a feasibility study with the described method. We find that our library can be used to simulate the behaviour of agents in a complex setting and observe a convergence to a global optimum in spite of the absence of stable states.

Suggested Citation

  • Thorsten Chmura & Johannes Kaiser & Thomas Pitz, 2007. "Simulating complex social behaviour with the genetic action tree kernel," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 355-377, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:13:y:2007:i:4:d:10.1007_s10588-007-9016-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10588-007-9016-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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