IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/climat/v175y2022i3d10.1007_s10584-022-03466-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Following the money: trade associations, political activity and climate change

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Brulle

    (Brown University)

  • Christian Downie

    (The Australian National University)

Abstract

The political activities of industries associated with the production and consumption of fossil fuels have thwarted state efforts to advance climate policy. Yet research on the role of trade associations that firms use to coordinate their activities remains sparse. Studies of business political activity are generally focussed on the firm level with trade associations typically considered only as part of wider advocacy coalitions. Scholars are still to examine the full range of political activities of trade associations. Using an original dataset built from trade associations’ IRS filings, we find that trade associations engaged on climate change spent $3.4 billion in 10 years on political activities, with the largest expenditure on advertising and promotion, followed by lobbying, grants and political contributions. Our data challenges the prevailing assumptions about the primary political activities of business actors. To explain the variation in spending, we present the findings from a regression analysis and semi-structured interviews. We argue that scholars have for too long failed to account for the political activities of trade associations, which are also one of the most important opponents of climate policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Brulle & Christian Downie, 2022. "Following the money: trade associations, political activity and climate change," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 1-19, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:climat:v:175:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10584-022-03466-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10584-022-03466-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10584-022-03466-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10584-022-03466-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Brulle, 2014. "Institutionalizing delay: foundation funding and the creation of U.S. climate change counter-movement organizations," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 122(4), pages 681-694, February.
    2. Jared Cory & Michael Lerner & Iain Osgood, 2021. "Supply Chain Linkages and the Extended Carbon Coalition," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 69-87, January.
    3. Bonica, Adam, 2016. "Avenues of influence: on the political expenditures of corporations and their directors and executives," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 367-394, December.
    4. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    5. Grier, Kevin B. & Munger, Michael C. & Roberts, Brian E., 1994. "The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(4), pages 911-926, December.
    6. Hall, Richard L. & Wayman, Frank W., 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 797-820, September.
    7. Milyo, Jeffrey & Primo, David & Groseclose, Timothy, 2000. "Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 75-88, April.
    8. Spillman, Lyn, 2012. "Solidarity in Strategy," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226769561, December.
    9. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2012. "Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 18-26.
    10. Hojnacki, Marie & Kimball, David C., 1998. "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 775-790, December.
    11. Kim, Sung Eun & Urpelainen, Johannes & Yang, Joonseok, 2016. "Electric utilities and American climate policy: lobbying by expected winners and losers," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 251-275, June.
    12. Levy David L. & Kolk Ans, 2002. "Strategic Responses to Global Climate Change: Conflicting Pressures on Multinationals in the Oil Industry," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(3), pages 1-27, November.
    13. repec:eme:aaaj00:09513570310505989 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Kowal, Michael S., 2018. "Corporate politicking, together: trade association ties, lobbying, and campaign giving," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 98-131, March.
    15. Robert J. Brulle & Melissa Aronczyk & Jason Carmichael, 2020. "Corporate promotion and climate change: an analysis of key variables affecting advertising spending by major oil corporations, 1986–2015," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 87-101, March.
    16. Tucker Andrew, 2008. "Trade Associations as Industry Reputation Agents: A Model of Reputational Trust," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-28, May.
    17. Tucker, Andrew, 2008. "Trade Associations as Industry Reputation Agents: A Model of Reputational Trust," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, April.
    18. Hansen, Wendy L. & Mitchell, Neil J., 2000. "Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 891-903, December.
    19. David J. Collison, 2003. "Corporate propaganda: its implications for accounting and accountability," Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 16(5), pages 853-886, December.
    20. Robert J. Brulle, 2018. "The climate lobby: a sectoral analysis of lobbying spending on climate change in the USA, 2000 to 2016," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 289-303, August.
    21. Downie, Christian, 2018. "Ad hoc coalitions in the U.S. energy sector: Case studies in the gas, oil, and coal industries," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 643-668, December.
    22. Jonas Meckling, 2015. "Oppose, Support, or Hedge? Distributional Effects, Regulatory Pressure, and Business Strategy in Environmental Politics," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 15(2), pages 19-37, May.
    23. Levy, David L. & Kolk, Ans, 2002. "Strategic Responses to Global Climate Change: Conflicting Pressures on Multinationals in the Oil Industry," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 275-300, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Réka Juhász & Nathan Lane, 2024. "The Political Economy of Industrial Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 11143, CESifo.
    2. Gregory Trencher & Mathieu Blondeel & Jusen Asuka, 2023. "Do all roads lead to Paris?," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 176(7), pages 1-33, July.
    3. Maxwell Boykoff, 2024. "Climate change countermovements and adaptive strategies: insights from Heartland Institute annual conferences a decade apart," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 1-17, January.
    4. Richard Bärnthaler & Andreas Novy & Lea Arzberger & Astrid Krisch & Hans Volmary, 2024. "The power to transform structures: power complexes and the challenges for realising a wellbeing economy," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-16, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brian Kelleher Richter & Krislert Samphantharak & Jeffrey F. Timmons, 2009. "Lobbying and Taxes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 893-909, October.
    2. Jared Cory & Michael Lerner & Iain Osgood, 2021. "Supply Chain Linkages and the Extended Carbon Coalition," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 69-87, January.
    3. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, 2013. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 19698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Woon Leong Lin, 2018. "Do Firm’s Organisational Slacks Influence the Relationship between Corporate Lobbying and Corporate Financial Performance? More Is Not Always Better," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-23, December.
    5. Alexander Fink, 2017. "Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 220-255, May.
    6. Maxwell Boykoff, 2024. "Climate change countermovements and adaptive strategies: insights from Heartland Institute annual conferences a decade apart," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 1-17, January.
    7. Masakazu Ogami, 2024. "The Conditionality of Political Short‐Termism: A Review of Empirical and Experimental Studies," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 12.
    8. Sanjay Patnaik, 2020. "Emissions permit allocation and strategic firm behavior: Evidence from the oil sector in the European Union emissions trading scheme," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 976-995, March.
    9. Federica Genovese & Endre Tvinnereim, 2019. "Who opposes climate regulation? Business preferences for the European emission trading scheme," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 511-542, September.
    10. Christian Downie, 2017. "Fighting for King Coal’s Crown: Business Actors in the US Coal and Utility Industries," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 17(1), pages 21-39, February.
    11. Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Kallias, Antonios & Kallias, Konstantinos & Tzeremes, Panayiotis G., 2017. "Political money contributions of U.S. IPOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 19-38.
    12. Irja Vormedal & Lars H. Gulbrandsen & Jon Birger Skjærseth, 2020. "Big Oil and Climate Regulation: Business as Usual or a Changing Business?," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 20(4), pages 143-166, Autumn.
    13. Richard Bärnthaler & Andreas Novy & Lea Arzberger & Astrid Krisch & Hans Volmary, 2024. "The power to transform structures: power complexes and the challenges for realising a wellbeing economy," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-16, December.
    14. Barber Benjamin & Weschle Simon & Pierskalla Jan, 2014. "Lobbying and the collective action problem: comparative evidence from enterprise surveys," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-26, August.
    15. William R. Kerr & William F. Lincoln & Prachi Mishra, 2014. "The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 343-379, November.
    16. Chen, Hui & Parsley, David & Yang, Ya-wen, 2010. "Corporate Lobbying and Financial Performance," MPRA Paper 21114, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Marianne Bertrand & Matilde Bombardini & Raymond Fisman & Francesco Trebbi, 2020. "Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(7), pages 2065-2102, July.
    18. Hye Young You, 2023. "Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 445-469, July.
    19. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2020. "Empirical Models of Lobbying," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 391-413, August.
    20. Tatyana Chesnokova, 2010. "Lobby Interaction and Trade Policy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2010-04, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:climat:v:175:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10584-022-03466-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.