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A dynamic advertising model in a vaccination campaign

Author

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  • Luca Grosset

    (University of Padova)

  • Bruno Viscolani

    (University of Padova)

Abstract

Vaccines save thousands of lives every year, but many people remain unvaccinated because serious adverse neurological disorders are wrongly attributed to vaccination. The “urban myth” of a relevant vaccine-associated risk is sustained by anti-vaccination groups and it is spread by word-of-mouth communication. We face the problem of increasing the vaccination coverage using an approach which draws some elements from the theory of dynamic advertising models. We propose a dynamic model for the evolution of the number of unvaccinated people and assume that a policy-maker can control this dynamics through advertising. From a mathematical point of view, we state and analyze an optimal control problem with a pure state constraint. We find the unique optimal solution, which minimizes a cost functional, but may fail to be satisfactory from the different viewpoint of moving towards eradication of the disease. Our analysis suggests that we modify the problem statement in order to consider explicitly the goal of reducing the number of unvaccinated people, to a level which guarantees the herd immunity. Hence we introduce an upper bound to the final number of unvaccinated people. From the solutions to the two problems we obtain some prescriptions for the policy-maker.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Grosset & Bruno Viscolani, 2021. "A dynamic advertising model in a vaccination campaign," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 29(2), pages 737-751, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:29:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s10100-020-00675-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-020-00675-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fouad El Ouardighi & Gustav Feichtinger & Dieter Grass & Richard F. Hartl & Peter M. Kort, 2016. "Advertising and Quality-Dependent Word-of-Mouth in a Contagion Sales Model," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 323-342, July.
    2. Huang, Jian & Leng, Mingming & Liang, Liping, 2012. "Recent developments in dynamic advertising research," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(3), pages 591-609.
    3. Alessandra Buratto & Luca Grosset & Bruno Viscolani, 2020. "A LQ Vaccine Communication Game," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Pierre-Olivier Pineau & Simon Sigué & Sihem Taboubi (ed.), Games in Management Science, pages 353-367, Springer.
    4. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
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