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Government Formation Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Slobodan Jelić

    (University J. J. Strossmayer of Osijek)

  • Domagoj Ševerdija

    (University J. J. Strossmayer of Osijek)

Abstract

In addition to the same political and ideological attitudes, members of political parties can be interconnected at private and/or professional levels. They are considered as a part of one large social network. After democratic elections, the total effectiveness and stability of a government may depend on expertness and cooperability of its members. Our main goal is not to give a mechanism for pre-elective government formation, but to propose a model that decides what can be a good subset of candidates for positions in the new government. The decision is based on expertness of candidates and their interconnections in the social network. Inspired by the Team Formation Problem in a social network, we present a Government Formation Problem. We prove that this problem is NP-hard and give an algorithm based on integer linear programming formulation. In the experimental part, we test our algorithm on simulated data using the Gurobi MILP solver.

Suggested Citation

  • Slobodan Jelić & Domagoj Ševerdija, 2018. "Government Formation Problem," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 26(3), pages 659-672, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:26:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s10100-017-0505-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-017-0505-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hanna Bäck & Patrick Dumont, 2008. "Making the first move," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 353-373, June.
    2. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
    3. Duin, C. W. & Volgenant, A. & Vo[ss], S., 2004. "Solving group Steiner problems as Steiner problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 154(1), pages 323-329, April.
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