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Modeling investment behavior under price cap regulation

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  • Thomas Nagel
  • Margarethe Rammerstorfer

Abstract

Motivated by the frequently observed criticism of the regulatory practice arising from companies in the industries concerned, we investigate the impact of regulation on investment behavior. Therefore, we model the investment timing and volume of a firm acting in a regulated market. When capping prices, the regulatory authority imposes a price ceiling on market prices. Accordingly, we use a real option approach where the price cap that limits possible future firm values enters the firm’s portfolio in form of a short call option position. By comparing this framework to a competitive benchmark model, we derive an optimal price setting rule for regulators. Moreover, it can be shown how deviations from this optimum affect the investment behavior of firms. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2009

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Nagel & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2009. "Modeling investment behavior under price cap regulation," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 17(2), pages 111-129, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:17:y:2009:i:2:p:111-129
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-008-0078-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Borrmann, Jörg & Brunekreeft, Gert, 2020. "The timing of monopoly investment under cost-based and price-based regulation," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    2. Scandizzo, Pasquale L. & Ventura, Marco, 2010. "Sharing risk through concession contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(1), pages 363-370, November.
    3. Heinz Stigler & Udo Bachhiesl & Gernot Nischler & Gerald Feichtinger, 2016. "ATLANTIS: techno-economic model of the European electricity sector," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 24(4), pages 965-988, December.
    4. Gunther Friedl, 2011. "Kostenbasierte Preisregulierung, Realoptionen und Investitionsanreize," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 63(63), pages 136-156, January.
    5. Janne Kettunen, Derek W. Bunn and William Blyth & Derek W. Bunn & William Blyth, 2011. "Investment Propensities under Carbon Policy Uncertainty," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 77-118.
    6. Sebastian Nick & Heike Wetzel, 2016. "The hidden cost of investment: the impact of adjustment costs on firm performance measurement and regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 33-55, February.
    7. Anna Pechan, 2014. "Which Incentives Does Regulation Give to Adapt Network Infrastructure to Climate Change? - A German Case Study," Working Papers V-365-14, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised May 2014.

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