Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?
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DOI: 10.1007/s12232-008-0040-y
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Cited by:
- David Sappington & Dennis Weisman, 2010. "Price cap regulation: what have we learned from 25 years of experience in the telecommunications industry?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 227-257, December.
- Strausz, Roland, 2009.
"The political economy of regulatory risk,"
SFB 649 Discussion Papers
2009-040, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Roland Strausz, 2010. "The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk," CESifo Working Paper Series 2953, CESifo.
- Fiocco, Raffaele & Guo, Dongyu, 2020.
"Regulatory risk, vertical integration, and upstream investment,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
- Fiocco, Raffaele & Guo, Dongyu, 2020. "Regulatory risk, vertical integration, and upstream investment," MPRA Paper 97960, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Regulation; Investment; Profit sharing; L51; D92; G31;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
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