Jurisdictional homogeneity and coterminous local government borders: a comparison of counties in New Jersey and New York State

Tiebout (J Polit Econ 64:416–424, 1956) argues that local public goods will be provided efficiently if households vote with their feet to move to the jurisdiction that best matches their preferences. This outcome may be impeded by overlapping jurisdictions of municipalities, school districts, and police agencies. To investigate the impact of coterminous borders on Tiebout sorting, two counties with similar demographics are chosen within the New York City metropolitan area. Differing histories lead to municipalities in Bergen County, NJ, always being coterminous with elementary school districts and police agencies, while few municipalities in Nassau County, NY, have their own police agencies and even fewer have their own school districts. Heterogeneity of sociodemographics and service quality are calculated between neighboring Census block groups, and absolute difference in median household income is regressed on these measures and interactions between the three kinds of service area borders. School district and police agency borders and quality are found to not be individually significant (with one minor exception). Police agency borders interacted with municipal borders increase income sorting, while school district borders interacted with police agency borders decrease income sorting. Income differences are also correlated with differences in the proportion of White and Black population in neighboring block groups, supporting previous findings that Tiebout sorting may exacerbate segregation. Municipal borders are an independently significant influence on income sorting across all specifications, indicating the important and independent role of local public goods other than education and public safety in residential location.