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Sequential entry and merger in spatial price discrimination

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  • John Heywood
  • Guangliang Ye

Abstract

This paper newly introduces sequential entry into previous models of spatial price discrimination that examine location choices made in anticipation of a potential merger. While merger with simultaneous entry routinely reduces social welfare, we show that mergers frequently improve welfare. The extent of welfare improving mergers varies inversely with the timing advantage of an excluded rival. When the rival locates alone in the first stage, the merger harms welfare. When the rival locates alone in the last stage, the merger improves welfare. These results hold true when allocating three firms across either two or three location stages. Thus, allowing staged entry dramatically alters and often reverses the conclusion previously drawn on the basis of simultaneous entry. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • John Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2013. "Sequential entry and merger in spatial price discrimination," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 50(3), pages 841-859, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:anresc:v:50:y:2013:i:3:p:841-859
    DOI: 10.1007/s00168-012-0516-2
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ralph M. Braid, 2017. "Efficiency-enhancing horizontal mergers in spatial competition," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 881-894, November.
    2. Guangliang Ye & Wenbin Wu, 2015. "Privatization and merger in a mixed oligopoly with spatial price discrimination," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 54(2), pages 561-576, March.
    3. John Heywood & Zheng Wang, 2014. "Spatial price discrimination and mergers with convex production costs," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-8, March.
    4. Ralph M. Braid, 2016. "Potential merger-forcing entry reduces maximum spacing between firms in spatial competition," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(3), pages 653-669, August.
    5. Gabriel Courey, 2018. "Spatial price discrimination, sequential location and convex production costs," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 223-232, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    L13; L41;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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