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Expected values for variable network games

Author

Listed:
  • Subhadip Chakrabarti

    (Queen’s University Belfast)

  • Loyimee Gogoi

    (Ahmedabad University)

  • Robert P. Gilles

    (Queen’s University Belfast)

  • Surajit Borkotokey

    (Dibrugarh University)

  • Rajnish Kumar

    (Queen’s University Belfast)

Abstract

A network game assigns a level of collectively generated wealth to every network that can form on a given set of players. A variable network game combines a network game with a network formation probability distribution, describing certain restrictions on network formation. Expected levels of collectively generated wealth and expected individual payoffs can be formulated in this setting. We investigate properties of the resulting expected wealth levels as well as the expected variants of well-established network game values as allocation rules that assign to every variable network game a payoff to the players in a variable network game. We establish two axiomatizations of the Expected Myerson Value, originally formulated and proven on the class of communication situations, based on the well-established component balance, equal bargaining power and balanced contributions properties. Furthermore, we extend an established axiomatization of the Position Value based on the balanced link contribution property to the Expected Position Value.

Suggested Citation

  • Subhadip Chakrabarti & Loyimee Gogoi & Robert P. Gilles & Surajit Borkotokey & Rajnish Kumar, 2024. "Expected values for variable network games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 336(3), pages 2061-2089, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:336:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10479-023-05530-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05530-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marco Slikker, 2005. "A characterization of the position value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(4), pages 505-514, November.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
    3. Borm, P.E.M. & Owen, G. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "On the position value for communication situations," Other publications TiSEM 5a8473e4-1df7-42df-ad53-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. A. Ghintran & E. González-Arangüena & C. Manuel, 2012. "A probabilistic position value," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 201(1), pages 183-196, December.
    5. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
    6. Borkotokey, Surajit & Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Gilles, Robert P. & Gogoi, Loyimee & Kumar, Rajnish, 2021. "Probabilistic network values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 169-180.
    7. Guillermo Owen, 1972. "Multilinear Extensions of Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 64-79, January.
    8. Calvo, Emilio & Lasaga, Javier & van den Nouweland, Anne, 1999. "Values of games with probabilistic graphs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 79-95, January.
    9. Gómez, D. & González-Arangüena, E. & Manuel, C. & Owen, G., 2008. "A value for generalized probabilistic communication situations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 190(2), pages 539-556, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network game; Variable network game; Network formation probabilities; Expected Myerson Value; Expected Position Value; Axiomatization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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