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Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Yukun Cheng

    (Suzhou University of Science and Technology)

  • Xiaotie Deng

    (Peking University)

  • Dominik Scheder

    (Shanghai Jiaotong University)

Abstract

Market makers choose and design market rules to serve certain objectives, such as to maximize revenue from the sales in the case of a single seller and multiple buyers. Given such rules, market participants play against each other to maximize their utility function values on goods acquired, possibly by hiding or misrepresenting their information needed in the implementation of market rules. Today’s Internet economy has changed the information collection process and may make some of the assumptions of market rule implementation obsolete. Here we make a fresh review of works on this challenge on the Internet where new economic systems operate.

Suggested Citation

  • Yukun Cheng & Xiaotie Deng & Dominik Scheder, 2022. "Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 314(1), pages 49-76, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:314:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-021-04482-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-021-04482-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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