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Ein neues Bankinsolvenzrecht für die Schweiz

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Listed:
  • Urs W. Birchler
  • Dominik Egli

Abstract

In Switzerland, new bank insolvency legislation is under consideration. The article compares the proposed regulation with the rules that would be optimal from an economic point of view. Optimal rules are a compromise between value maximization and absolute priority on the one hand (ex post optimality), and the avoidance of perverse incentives on the other (ex ante optimality). Existing Swiss rules are severely deficient in these respects. In contrast, the proposed revision is a reasonable approximation to an economic optimum in some respects, while it deviates from it in others.

Suggested Citation

  • Urs W. Birchler & Dominik Egli, 2003. "Ein neues Bankinsolvenzrecht für die Schweiz," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 139(II), pages 125-154, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:2003-ii-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate bankruptcy; Insolvency regulation; Bank restructuring; Systemic stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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