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Bankruptcy law: a mechanism of governance for financially distressed firms

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  • Régis Blazy
  • Bertrand Chopard
  • Agnès Fimayer

Abstract

This paper explores the various governance models for financially distressed firms. We offer a new typology of major bankruptcy models and provide a connection between this bankruptcy law puzzle and the variables depicting the governance of healthy firms in order to shed light on two topics: (1) the factors that the lawyer should consider before removing its national bankruptcy law, and (2) the risks associated with each bankruptcy model according to the economic literature on bankruptcy law. Our final aim is to test whether the various bankruptcy models detailed in the paper perform in separate economic and legal environments.
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  • Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Agnès Fimayer, 2008. "Bankruptcy law: a mechanism of governance for financially distressed firms," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 253-267, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:25:y:2008:i:3:p:253-267
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-008-9048-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises [Strategic default and bankruptcy law]," MPRA Paper 14366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Marianna Succurro, 2008. "Bankruptcy Systems And Economic Performance Across Contries: Some Empirical Evidence," Working Papers 200801, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    3. Lukason, Oliver & Laitinen, Erkki K., 2019. "Firm failure processes and components of failure risk: An analysis of European bankrupt firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 380-390.
    4. Mathur, Aparna, 2013. "Beyond bankruptcy: Does the US bankruptcy code provide a fresh start to entrepreneurs?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4198-4216.
    5. Stefan Mayr & Christine Duller & Matthias Baschinger, 2023. "Assessment of formal proceedings and out-of-court reorganisation: results from a survey among turnaround professionals in Austria," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 325-367, October.
    6. Couwenberg, Oscar & Lubben, Stephen J., 2013. "Solving creditor problems in the twilight zone: Superfluous law and inadequate private solutions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 61-76.
    7. Marianna Succurro, 2012. "Bankruptcy systems and economic performance across countries: some empirical evidence," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 101-126, February.
    8. Erkki Laitinen, 2011. "Assessing viability of Finnish reorganization and bankruptcy firms," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 167-198, April.
    9. Nicolae STEF, 2013. "Severity of the Voting Rules in Bankruptcy," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2013-07, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    10. Díaz-Díaz, Nieves Lidia & García-Teruel, Pedro J. & Martínez-Solano, Pedro, 2016. "Debt maturity structure in private firms: Does the family control matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 393-411.
    11. Róbert Štefko & Jarmila Horváthová & Martina Mokrišová, 2020. "Bankruptcy Prediction with the Use of Data Envelopment Analysis: An Empirical Study of Slovak Businesses," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-15, September.
    12. Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard, 2012. "(Un)secured debt and the likelihood of court-supervised reorganization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 45-61, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankruptcy; Governance; Law and economics; K29;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K29 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Other

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