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Оценка Влияния Эффективного Контракта На Публикационную Активность Преподавателей: Кейс Регионального Университета

Author

Listed:
  • Антосик Л. В.
  • Шевченко Е. С.

Abstract

Антосик Любовь Валерьевна - кандидат экономических наук, доцент кафедры экономической теории, мировой и региональной экономики Волгоградского государственного университета. E-mail: AntosikLV@volsu.ruШевченко Екатерина Сергеевна - старший преподаватель кафедры экономической теории, мировой и региональной экономики Волгоградского государственного университета. E-mail: ShevchenkoES@volsu.ruВведение эффективного контракта в бюджетном секторе экономики Российской Федерации было обусловлено необходимостью обеспечить соответствие заработной платы и качества оказываемых услуг. Обзор существующих исследований академических контрактов и практик стимулирования публикационной активности в российских и зарубежных университетах показал, что ключевыми факторами научной активности преподавателей являются их внутренняя мотивация, наличие благоприятной академической среды, характер отношений в коллективе. В работе проведен анализ двух систем стимулирования публикационной активности в вузе: в рамках расчета рейтинга научной активности и системы эффективного контракта. Для анализа введения эффективного контракта в образовательных организациях исследователями используются преимущественно контент-анализ нормативно-правовых актов и социологические опросы. Авторы на основе данных по публикационной активности преподавателей института за шесть лет (три года до введения эффективного контракта и три года после) провели эконометрическое исследование влияния эффективного контракта на количество и качество публикаций. Для тестирования авторской гипотезы использовались модели с детерминированными индивидуальными эффектами, со случайными эффектами, а также метод наименьших квадратов и МНК с применением дамми-переменных. Предложена методика оценки влияния эффективного контракта на публикационную активность преподавателей. Сделан вывод, что на количество публикаций значимое положительное влияние оказали материальные факторы, а также участие в конференциях и повышение квалификации преподавателей. На качество публикаций значимо повлияли стимулирующая выплата и повышение квалификации. Введение эффективного контракта оказало воздействие только на общее количество публикаций.

Suggested Citation

  • Антосик Л. В. & Шевченко Е. С., 2018. "Оценка Влияния Эффективного Контракта На Публикационную Активность Преподавателей: Кейс Регионального Университета," Вопросы образования // Educational Studies Moscow, National Research University Higher School of Economics, issue 3, pages 247-267.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:voprob:2018:i:3:p:247-267
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    References listed on IDEAS

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