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Моделирование И Эмпирическая Оценка Параллелизма В Поведении На Торгах

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  • Шаститко А. Е.
  • Шаститко А. А.

Abstract

Статья посвящена стандартам экономического анализа в антимонопольныхделах на примере дела по статье об ограничивающих конкуренцию соглашениях хозяйствующих субъектов (ст. 11 Федерального закона "О защите конкуренции" N 135-ФЗ от 26 июля 2006 г.). В статье предложен методологический подход к анализу параллельного поведения компаний на аукционе, основанный на экономической теории и количественном анализе результатов аукциона. Разработка новых методологических подходов необходима для применения норм антимонопольного законодательства в условиях, когда поведение компании не может быть квалифицировано как нарушение per se. Предложенный анализ параллельного поведения компаний на аукционе состоит из трех основных частей: выявление внешних факторов, которые обуславливают синхронное поведение компаний; демонстрация приводящей к наблюдаемому поведению мотивации компаний, обусловленной данными факторами; количественный анализ данных для установления вероятности такой мотивации компаний. Согласно полученным результатам, наблюдаемый параллелизм в поведении может не являться следствием сговора, а быть вызванным внешними экономическими факторами. На основании данных о результатах торгов за право на установку рекламных конструкций в одном из российских городов, с помощью метода математического анализа, теории вероятности, теории игр и математической статистики было продемонстрировано, как сложившиеся условия на рынке могли привести к наблюдаемому поведению компаний и с какой вероятностью наблюдаемое поведение могло иметь место без предварительного соглашения между компаниями. Сделан вывод, что вероятность наблюдаемого поведения компаний без предварительного соглашения более 50%. Идея предложенной структуры экономического анализа может быть использована при рассмотрении широкого круга антимонопольный дел о сговоре и согласованных действиях.

Suggested Citation

  • Шаститко А. Е. & Шаститко А. А., 2017. "Моделирование И Эмпирическая Оценка Параллелизма В Поведении На Торгах," Вопросы государственного и муниципального управления // Public administration issues, НИУ ВШЭ, issue 4, pages 7-28.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:vgmu00:2017:i:4:p:7-28
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    References listed on IDEAS

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