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Pillars of Trust: An Experimental Study on Reputation and Its Effects

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Listed:
  • Riccardo Boero
  • Giangiacomo Bravo
  • Marco Castellani
  • Francesco LaganÃ
  • Flaminio Squazzoni

Abstract

This paper presents the results of laboratory experiments on the relevance of reputation for trust and cooperation in social interaction. We have extended a repeated investment game by adding new treatments where reputation is taken more explicitly into account than before. We then compared treatments where the investor and the trustee rate each other and treatments where the investor and the trustee were rated by a third party. The results showed that: (i) third party reputation positively affects cooperation by encapsulating trust; (ii) certain differences in the reputation mechanism can generate different cooperation outcomes. These results have interesting implications for the recent sociological debate on the normative pillars of markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Riccardo Boero & Giangiacomo Bravo & Marco Castellani & Francesco Laganà & Flaminio Squazzoni, 2009. "Pillars of Trust: An Experimental Study on Reputation and Its Effects," Sociological Research Online, , vol. 14(5), pages 49-67, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:socres:v:14:y:2009:i:5:p:49-67
    DOI: 10.5153/sro.2042
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mauricio Salgado & Alejandra Vásquez & Alejandra Yáñez, 2019. "Do Young People Adapt Their Prosocial Behaviour to That of Their Peers? An Experimental Exploration," Sociological Research Online, , vol. 24(3), pages 332-352, September.
    2. Squazzoni, Flaminio & Bravo, Giangiacomo & Takács, Károly, 2013. "Does incentive provision increase the quality of peer review? An experimental study," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 287-294.
    3. Takács, Károly, 2010. "Hálózati kísérletek [Network experiments]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 958-979.

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