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Group Size and One-Shot Collective Action

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  • AXEL FRANZEN

    (University of Berne)

Abstract

Situations of collective actions have been modeled as iterated N- person Prisoner's Dilemma games or N- person Chicken games. Although there exists some experimental evidence with regard to the effects of group size in iterated dilemmas, very little attention has been given to one-shot social dilemmas. This article argues that some social dilemmas can be modeled as one-shot games. Furthermore, it discusses and provides experimental evidence on the effects of group size on cooperation in four different one-shot games. The results confirm the hypotheses that there are no group-size effects in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and in the one-shot Chicken game. However, group size does have a negative effect on the cooperation rate in both the Volunteer's Dilemma and in the Assurance game.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Franzen, 1995. "Group Size and One-Shot Collective Action," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(2), pages 183-200, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:7:y:1995:i:2:p:183-200
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463195007002006
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    Cited by:

    1. Bolle, Friedel & Spiller, Jörg, 2016. "Not efficient but payoff dominant: Experimental investigations of equilibrium play in binary threshold public good games," Discussion Papers 379, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    2. Kamei, Kenju, 2020. "Group size effect and over-punishment in the case of third party enforcement of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 395-412.
    3. Campos-Mercade, Pol, 2022. "When are groups less moral than individuals?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 20-36.
    4. Lise Vesterlund, 2015. "Breaking the Glass Ceiling with "No": Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Non-Promotable Tasks," Working Paper 5663, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    5. McCarter, Matthew W. & Rockmann, Kevin W. & Northcraft, Gregory B., 2010. "Is it even worth it? The effect of loss prospects in the outcome distribution of a public goods dilemma," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 1-12, January.
    6. Doğan, Pınar, 2020. "Gender differences in volunteer’s dilemma: Evidence from teamwork among graduate students," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    7. Bergstrom, Ted & Garratt, Rodney & Leo, Greg, 2019. "Let me, or let George? Motives of competing altruists," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 269-283.
    8. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai & James E. Jensen, 2015. "Leadership and gender in groups: An experiment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(1), pages 368-388, February.
    9. Roman M. Sheremeta & Matthew W. McCarter, 2013. "You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups," Working Papers 13-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    10. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai, 2008. "Leadership and Gender: An Experiment," Working Papers 2008-4, Saint Cloud State University, Department of Economics.
    11. Victoria Basolo, 2003. "US Regionalism and Rationality," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 40(3), pages 447-462, March.
    12. Friedel Bolle & Philipp E. Otto, 2022. "The flip side of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 75-92, January.
    13. Malte Müller & Jens Rommel & Christian Kimmich, 2018. "Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies: Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 19(2), pages 119-139, May.
    14. Campos-Mercade, Pol, 2021. "The volunteer’s dilemma explains the bystander effect," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 646-661.
    15. Wojtek Przepiorka & Andreas Diekmann, 2018. "Heterogeneous groups overcome the diffusion of responsibility problem in social norm enforcement," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(11), pages 1-18, November.
    16. Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian, 2018. "Volunteering under population uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 65-81.
    17. Hillenbrand, Adrian & Werner, Tobias & Winter, Fabian, 2022. "Willingness to volunteer among remote workers is insensitive to the team size," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-050, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    18. Adrian Hillenbrand & Tobias Werner & Fabian Winter, 2020. "Volunteering at the Workplace under Incomplete Information: Teamsize Does Not Matter," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2020_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    19. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Smith, Angela M., 2017. "An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 303-315.
    20. Toshiji Kawagoe & Taisuke Matsubae & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2018. "Quantal response equilibria in a generalized Volunteer’s Dilemma and step-level public goods games with binary decision," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 11-23, June.
    21. Azi Lev-On & Alex Chavez & Cristina Bicchieri, 2010. "Group and Dyadic Communication in Trust Games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(1), pages 37-54, February.
    22. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Binary-Choice Games: Entry, Voting, Public Goods, and the Volunteers' Dilemma," Virginia Economics Online Papers 328, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
    23. Dogan, Pinar, 2019. "Gender Differences in Volunteer's Dilemma: Evidence from Teamwork among Graduate Students," Working Paper Series rwp19-001, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    24. McCarter, Matthew W. & Budescu, David V. & Scheffran, Jürgen, 2011. "The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation of a hybrid social dilemma," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 83-95, September.
    25. Werner, Tobias & Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian, 2020. "Volunteering at the Workplace under Incomplete Information: Team Size Does Not Matter," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224519, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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