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Non-state order and strategic communication via symbolic dress in Yemen

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  • Daniel Corstange

Abstract

How do people keep order in weak states? Formal institutions provide law and order in rich societies, but are feeble and capricious in much of the developing world. Instead, people turn to informal, group-based order that operates through reputation and contingent cooperation. Such order requires people to police social boundaries and contributions, looking for costly signals of membership and commitment to weed out mimics and shirkers. Data from Yemen show that people rely on tribes for security and dispute resolution under customary law. Yemenis use a prominent symbol of tribalism, the iconic tribal dagger, to communicate their affiliations and commitments to their customary responsibilities. Yet people vary in how well they understand the semiotic system, and the accuracy of the link between dagger-wearing and tribalism improves with sophistication. While the most knowledgeable Yemenis reveal their tribal types with the dagger, the least knowledgeable communicate nothing at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Corstange, 2021. "Non-state order and strategic communication via symbolic dress in Yemen," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 3-51, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:33:y:2021:i:1:p:3-51
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463120985322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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