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Partial participation towards collective action: To stifle or instigate

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Funcke

    (Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, USA)

  • Ulrik Franke

    (Software and Systems Engineering Laboratory, Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Sweden; Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden)

Abstract

In this paper we extend the Granovetter threshold model with partial participation towards a collective action. That is, agents may partake by conducting an action that is less costly than the ultimate collective action, but costly enough to signal a commitment to the cause. We show that it is not just the exact distribution of thresholds, but also the distribution of available actions that determines whether a collective action will be achieved. We suggest and prove propositions for how both an inventive “activist†and a “dictator†may strategically change the signaling value of existing actions, or introduce new ones, in order to either instigate or stifle collective action. Applying the theory to revolutions, we argue that new technology can play a role beyond that of communication and synchronization, viz. that of adding modes of partial, less arduous, participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Funcke & Ulrik Franke, 2016. "Partial participation towards collective action: To stifle or instigate," Rationality and Society, , vol. 28(4), pages 453-467, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:28:y:2016:i:4:p:453-467
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463116658873
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    Cited by:

    1. Niccolò G. Armandola & Malte Doehne & Katja Rost, 2024. "Explaining mobilization for revolts by private interests and kinship relations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 36(2), pages 254-285, May.

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