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Bribe-Switching

Author

Listed:
  • Jamie Bologna Pavlik
  • Desiree Desierto

Abstract

The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign public officials. We uncover an unintended consequence—the shadow economies of the countries of these officials increase after FCPA enforcement. Our hypothesis is that corrupt officials may be switching to taking bribes from illegal markets. We find that one case of FCPA enforcement alone increases the shadow economy by as much as 0.27 percentage points (pp), tree loss—an indicator of illegal logging—by 0.027 pp, and trade misinvoicing by 0.5 pp. Our results suggest the need to harmonize anti-corruption policies across all sectors—legal and illegal.

Suggested Citation

  • Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Desiree Desierto, 2024. "Bribe-Switching," Public Finance Review, , vol. 52(6), pages 862-909, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:52:y:2024:i:6:p:862-909
    DOI: 10.1177/10911421241248719
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; bribery; shadow economy; illegal markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy

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