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A Dynamic Approach to Tax Evasion

Author

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  • Basil Dalamagas

    (Department of Economics, University of Athens, Athens, Greece, dalamaga@econ.uoa.gr)

Abstract

Standard models of tax evasion use a static decision-under-uncertainty setting to determine how an individual’s evasion decision is affected by the fiscal instruments. Most of these models fail to create a framework, within which unique relationships between tax evasion and its main determinants (especially tax rates and actual income) could be derived. The purpose of this paper is to establish a new pattern of unambiguous relationships in the evasion theory, by shifting the emphasis from the comparative static analysis of previous studies to a comparative-dynamics framework in the context of a neoclassical growth model, in which time and the average burden from all kinds of taxes also play an important role in affecting the taxpayer’s decision making process.

Suggested Citation

  • Basil Dalamagas, 2011. "A Dynamic Approach to Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(2), pages 309-326, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:39:y:2011:i:2:p:309-326
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142110386213
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. L. S. Di Mauro & A. Pluchino & A. E. Biondo, 2018. "A Game of Tax Evasion: evidences from an agent-based model," Papers 1809.08146, arXiv.org.
    2. Laszlo Goerke, 2013. "Human Capital Formation And Tax Evasion," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 91-105, January.
    3. Levaggi, Rosella & Menoncin, Francesco, 2012. "Tax audits, fines and optimal tax evasion in a dynamic context," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 318-321.
    4. Yi-Chung Hsu & Chien-Chiang Lee, 2016. "Factors Affecting Tax Evasion: Do Interest Rate And Regional Effects Matter?," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 61(04), pages 1-23, September.
    5. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.

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