An Empirical Model of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Hashimzade, Nigar & Myles, Gareth D. & Rablen, Matthew D., 2016. "Predictive analytics and the targeting of audits," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 130-145.
- Torgler, Benno & Valev, Neven T, 2006.
"Public Attitudes toward Corruption and Tax Evasion: Investigating the role of gender over time,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
qt3983136n, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Benno Torgler & Neven T. Valev, 2007. "Public Attitudes Toward Corruption and Tax Evasion: Investigating the Role of Gender Over Time," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 214, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
- Ahmad, Sanep & Md Noor, Nor Ghani & Daud, Zulkifli, 2011. "Tax-Based Modeling of Zakat Compliance," Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, vol. 45, pages 101-108.
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2010.
"Why Pay Taxes When No One Else Does?,"
Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 374-385, May.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2009. "Why Pay Taxes When No One Else Does?," IZA Discussion Papers 4153, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2009. "Why Pay Taxes When No One Else Does?," Departmental Working Papers 200902, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Myles, Gareth D. & Naylor, Robin A., 1996. "A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 49-66, April.
- Ratbek Dzhumashev & Emin Gahramanov, 2008.
"Can We Tax The Desire For Tax Evasion?,"
Monash Economics Working Papers
28/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Dzhumashev, Ratbek & Gahramanov, Emin, 2008. "Can we tax the desire for tax evasion?," Working Papers eco_2008_19, Deakin University, Department of Economics.
- Basil Dalamagas, 2011. "A Dynamic Approach to Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(2), pages 309-326, March.
- Fabrizio Balassone & Philip Jones, 1998. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: Properties of a Penalty Structure," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(3), pages 270-285, May.
- Josef Falkinger & Herbert Walther, 1991. "Rewards Versus Penalties: on a New Policy against Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(1), pages 67-79, January.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2024. "Herding, taxpayer's rent seeking and endemic corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 533-546.
- Torgler, Benno, 2006.
"The importance of faith: Tax morale and religiosity,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 81-109, September.
- Benno Torgler, 2003. "The Importance of Faith: Tax Morale and Religiosity," CREMA Working Paper Series 2003-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Benno Torgler & Neven T. Valev, 2006. "Women and Illegal Activities: Gender Differences and Women?s Willingness to Comply over Time," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-15, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Laura Sour, 2004.
"An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity,"
Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, CIDE, División de Economía, vol. 0(1), pages 43-61, January-J.
- Sour, Laura, 2004. "An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity," MPRA Paper 50334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, "undated". "Steuermoral und Steuerhinterziehung," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-18, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Hannelore Weck-Hannemann & Werner W. Pommerehne, 1989. "Einkommensteuerhinterziehung in der Schweiz: Eine empirische Analyse," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 125(IV), pages 515-556, December.
- Hashimzade, Nigar & Myles, Gareth D. & Page, Frank & Rablen, Matthew D., 2014. "Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 134-146.
- Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth Myles, 2017. "Risk-based Audits in a Behavioral Model," Public Finance Review, , vol. 45(1), pages 140-165, January.
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