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Hunting the Unobservables for Optimal Social Security

Author

Listed:
  • Frank N. Caliendo

    (Utah State University, frank.caliendo@usu.edu)

  • Emin Gahramanov

    (Deakin University)

Abstract

We study the optimal size of a pay-as-you-go social security program for an economy composed of both permanent-income and hand-to-mouth consumers. While previous work on this topic is framed within a two-period partial equilibrium setup, we study this issue in a life-cycle general equilibrium model. Because this type of welfare analysis depends critically on unobservable preference parameters, we methodically consider all parameterizations of the unobservables that are both feasible and reasonable—all parameterizations that can mimic key features of macro data (feasible) while still being consistent with micro evidence and convention (reasonable). The baseline model predicts that the optimal tax rate is between 6 percent and 15 percent of wage income.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank N. Caliendo & Emin Gahramanov, 2009. "Hunting the Unobservables for Optimal Social Security," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(4), pages 470-502, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:37:y:2009:i:4:p:470-502
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142109332053
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Frank Caliendo & T. Findley, 2013. "Limited computational ability and social security," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(3), pages 414-433, June.
    2. Caliendo, Frank N., 2011. "Time-inconsistent preferences and social security: Revisited in continuous time," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 668-675, May.
    3. Frank Caliendo & Emin Gahramanov, 2013. "Myopia and pensions in general equilibrium," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 37(3), pages 375-401, July.
    4. Emin Gahramanov & Xueli Tang, 2016. "Impatient in Experiments, but Patient in Simulations: A Challenge to the Heckman-Type Model," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 92(297), pages 268-290, June.
    5. Frank N. Caliendo & T. Scott Findley, 2020. "Myopia, education, and social security," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(3), pages 694-720, June.

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