IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/pubfin/v37y2009i3p269-288.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intrastate Competition for Debt Resources

Author

Listed:
  • Dwight V. Denison

    (University of Kentucky, dwight.denison@uky.edu)

  • Merl M. Hackbart

    (University of Kentucky)

  • Michael J. Moody

    (University of Kansas)

Abstract

Limited economic resources create constraints that force trade-offs among desired objectives. Likewise, state-balanced budget requirements force policy makers to make budgetary trade-offs among competing state programs. Constrained state resources have also encouraged states to issue bonds to finance infrastructure and capital assets rather than using pay-as-you-go financing for such investments. However, the expanded use of debt financing often faces another constraint known as debt capacity. As a result, states may be required to make trade-offs among the competing demands for debt financing similar to the trade-offs they must make for operating program expenditures. The authors' empirical findings indicate that tradeoffs occur between highway project—related debt and other state debt in those states with formal restrictions on total general obligation and revenue-backed debt (umbrella debt limits). In states without umbrella debt limits, there is no evidence of a trade-off between the highway debt and all other state debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Dwight V. Denison & Merl M. Hackbart & Michael J. Moody, 2009. "Intrastate Competition for Debt Resources," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(3), pages 269-288, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:37:y:2009:i:3:p:269-288
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142108323486
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1091142108323486
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1091142108323486?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Domke, William K. & Eichenberg, Richard C. & Kelleher, Catherine M., 1983. "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 19-35, March.
    2. Kiewiet, D Roderick & Szakaly, Kristin, 1996. "Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 62-97, April.
    3. Clingermayer, James C. & Dan Wood, B., 1995. "Disentangling Patterns of State Debt Financing," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 108-120, March.
    4. Michael A. Ellis & D. Eric Schansberg, 1999. "The Determinants of State Government Debt Financing," Public Finance Review, , vol. 27(6), pages 571-587, November.
    5. Ratchford, B. U., 1938. "Constitutional Provisions Governing State Borrowing," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 694-707, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Robert A. Greer & Dwight V. Denison, 2016. "Determinants of Debt Concentration at the State Level," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 111-130, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert A. Greer & Dwight V. Denison, 2016. "Determinants of Debt Concentration at the State Level," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 111-130, December.
    2. Skip Krueger & Robert W. Walker, 2008. "Divided Government, Political Turnover, and State Bond Ratings," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(3), pages 259-286, May.
    3. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2018. "Resource Windfalls and Public Debt: The Role of Political Myopia," OxCarre Working Papers 205, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    4. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Resource windfalls and public debt: A political economy perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    5. Christian F. Pfeil & Lars P. Feld, 2024. "Does the Swiss Debt Brake Induce Sound Federal Finances? A Synthetic Control Analysis," Public Finance Review, , vol. 52(1), pages 3-41, January.
    6. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2017. "Political Myopia, Public Debt," OxCarre Working Papers 200, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    7. Nicolas Guadalupe Zuniga-Espinoza & Celia Ruth Sainz-Lopez & Erick Zuniga-Soto, 2021. "The Growth of public debt in Coahuila, Mexico," Technium Social Sciences Journal, Technium Science, vol. 17(1), pages 166-174, March.
    8. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Reelection, growth and public debt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Maria Teresa Balaguer-Coll & Mariya Ivanova-Toneva, 2019. "The impact women's leadership in local Governments: The case of Spain," Working Papers 2019/05, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    10. Cheng, Yudan & Jia, Shanghui & Meng, Huan, 2022. "Fiscal policy choices of local governments in China: Land finance or local government debt?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 294-308.
    11. Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2010. "On the link between fiscal decentralization and public debt in OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 351-378, December.
    12. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2000. "Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen der direkten Demokratie," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(2), pages 161-180, May.
    13. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2010. "Direkte Demokratie," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2010 2010-26, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    14. Hallerberg, Mark & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,35, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    15. Daniela Monacelli & Maria Grazia Pazienza & Chiara Rapallini, 2016. "Municipality Budget Rules and Debt: Is the Italian Regulation Effective?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 114-140, September.
    16. Heiko T. Burret & Lars P. Feld, 2016. "Effects of Fiscal Rules - 85 Years' Experience in Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 6063, CESifo.
    17. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    18. Seemab Gillani & Muhammad Nouman Shafiq & Tusawar Iftikhar Ahmad, 2019. "Military Expenditures and Health Outcomes: A Global Perspective," iRASD Journal of Economics, International Research Alliance for Sustainable Development (iRASD), vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, June.
    19. Christopher A. Simon & Michael C. Moltz, 2019. "Immigrant Citizens and Racial Resentment in International Policy Perspective: The Role of Nativity and Racial Resentment in Shaping Support for US Foreign Assistance Expenditure, 2002–2016," Development, Palgrave Macmillan;Society for International Deveopment, vol. 62(1), pages 186-195, December.
    20. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Violeta Vulovic, 2017. "How well do subnational borrowing regulations work?," Chapters, in: Naoyuki Yoshino & Peter J. Morgan (ed.), Central and Local Government Relations in Asia, chapter 5, pages 161-220, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:37:y:2009:i:3:p:269-288. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.