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Competitive Governments, Globalization, and Equalization Grants

Author

Listed:
  • Albert Breton

    (University of Toronto, Ontario)

  • Angela Fraschini

    (Universitá del Piemonte Orientale "Amedeo Avogadro," Alessandria, Italy)

Abstract

The competition that permeates the public sector acts as a force to discipline public sector actors. But it also serves to build links between the volume of goods and services supplied by public bodies and the prices that citizens must pay for them. Globalization, by permitting a greater mobility of capital, makes it possible for larger business corporations to become more effective oligopsonists when bargaining with governments for the goods and services they need, thus weakening the links between the things provided to citizens and the prices the latter must pay. Equalization payments, by permitting more effective intergovernmental competition, reduce the negative effects of globalization on the links that competition forges.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert Breton & Angela Fraschini, 2007. "Competitive Governments, Globalization, and Equalization Grants," Public Finance Review, , vol. 35(4), pages 463-479, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:35:y:2007:i:4:p:463-479
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142106296413
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Paolo Liberati, 2011. "‘‘Which Tax’’ or ‘‘Which Tax for What?’’: Tax Assignment in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(3), pages 365-392, May.
    3. Mark A. Moore & Aidan R. Vining, 2023. "PPP performance evaluation: the social welfare goal, principal–agent theory and political economy," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 56(2), pages 267-299, June.

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