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Do Differences in Heterogeneity and Intergovernmental Competition Help Explain Variation in the Private School Share? Evidence From Early California Statehood

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  • Thomas A. Downes

    (Tufts University)

Abstract

This essay documents the persistent tnterstate and mtrastate differences in private Abstract school enrollment shares in the United States and argues that heterogeneity of the population and the extent of intergovernmental competition could be important factors in explaining these differences. To further explore this argument, this article considers determmants of the public and private school shares in the early days of California statehood. Measures of the heterogeneity of school distncts, of the resultant ability of districts to provide publccly the optimal amount of education for the majority of their residents, and of the extent of intergovernmental competition are shown to explain a sIgnificant portion of the variation across California counties in the public and private shares. Furthermore, simulation results indicate that these determinants of private school demand played an important role in the evolution of the equilibrium public and pnvate shares in the early years of California statehood.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas A. Downes, 1996. "Do Differences in Heterogeneity and Intergovernmental Competition Help Explain Variation in the Private School Share? Evidence From Early California Statehood," Public Finance Review, , vol. 24(3), pages 291-318, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:24:y:1996:i:3:p:291-318
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219602400301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas J. Nechyba, 2003. "Centralization, Fiscal Federalism, and Private School Attendance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(1), pages 179-204, February.
    2. Barrow, Lisa, 2006. "Private school location and neighborhood characteristics," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 633-645, December.
    3. Christopher B. Colburn & John B. Horowitz, 2003. "Local Politics and the Demand for Public Education," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 40(4), pages 797-807, April.

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