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The Problem with Authoritarian Populists

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick Francois
  • Chris Bidner

Abstract

We assume that even though voters prefer the policies of their favoured leader they value democracy more greatly. This means that voters on both sides of a polarised policy divide would be willing to sacrifice their preferred policy if it would mean preserving democracy. However voters on one side are unsure whether voters on the other side share this commitment to democracy. We show that in such a situation an autocratic populist leader can act in ways that will undermine opposing voters beliefs that the leader’s supporters continue to value democracy. If these beliefs become pessimistic enough, a self-reinforcing cycle of mutual suspicion between voters on opposing sides leads to the inexorable demise of democracy and its replacement by autocratic rule. Understanding this, an elected leader who aspires to rule via non-democratic means may follow such autocratic populist policies in order to entrench their rule. JEL Classifications: D72, P16, P17, P48

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Francois & Chris Bidner, 2024. "The Problem with Authoritarian Populists," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 12(1), pages 59-73, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:miceco:v:12:y:2024:i:1:p:59-73
    DOI: 10.1177/23210222241237041
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alia Braley & Gabriel S. Lenz & Dhaval Adjodah & Hossein Rahnama & Alex Pentland, 2023. "Why voters who value democracy participate in democratic backsliding," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 7(8), pages 1282-1293, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democratic backsliding; authoritarianism; political agency model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P17 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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